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Environmental
Law. Disrupted. 
by Inara Scott, David Takacs, Rebecca 
Bratspies, Vanessa Casado Pérez, Robin Kundis 
Craig, Keith Hirokawa, Blake Hudson, Sarah 
Krakof, Katrina Fischer Kuh, Jessica Owley, 
Melissa Powers, Shannon Roesler, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, J.B. Ruhl, and Erin Ryan 
Summary 
Te U.S. regulatory environment is changing rapidly, 
at the same time that visible and profound impacts of 
climate change are already being felt throughout the 
world, and enormous, potentially existential threats 
loom in the not-so-distant future. What does it mean 
to think about and practice environmental law in this 
setting? In this latest in a biannual series of postings 
and essays, the authors, members of the Environmen-
tal Law Collaborative (ELC), have taken on the ques-
tion of whether environmental law as we currently 
know it is up to the job of addressing these threats; 
and, if not, what the path forward should be. 
Authors’ Note: Te Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC) 
comprises a rotating group of law professors who assemble every other 
year to think, discuss, and write on an important and intriguing 
theme in environmental law. Te goals of this meeting are both 
scholarly and practical, as ELC participants seek to use their disparate 
areas of scholarly expertise to study trends and important events in 
the law, and ultimately to improve the environmental conditions 
of the world in which we live. Te ELC would like to thank the 
Environmental Law Institute for its continued support of these 
eforts, which have resulted in multiple collections of essays and two 
full-length books. We would also like to thank the Drake University 
Law School and Albany Law School for their support of this project. 
In 2017, the U.S. regulatory environment began aperiod of intense change, even as the world witnessedthe escalation of visible and profound impacts from
climate change. Alongside these events, and with full
knowledge of the limited time left in which to address
existential environmental challenges, the authors, as par-
ticipants in the 2018 Environmental Law Collaborative,
considered whether environmental law as we know it is
up to the task of meeting these ongoing, escalating, and
perilous threats. 
Each of the following sections considers where envi-
ronmental law should be headed in the next decade or
more, and how we might get there. Tese short pieces
consider whether and how to reframe and reshape—and,
ultimately, disrupt—the environmental law landscape to
better address the catastrophic, synergistic, and disruptive
ecological changes portended by climate change, biodiver-
sity destruction, and social inequality. Tey consider at a
deep level what it might be like if we radically and fun-
damentally reoriented our environmental law and policy
agenda, and ask: is this possible, desirable, or both? 
As we are a diverse group of scholars and thinkers, our
conclusions are by no means uniform, but they share a
common thread: this is not time for business as usual. Te
system requires signifcant, potentially disruptive changes,
some of which may make us profoundly uncomfortable.
We hope these essays disrupt your thinking in provocative,
productive ways, and we look forward to opening a dia-
log with you about how we can reframe, reshape, and ulti-
mately disrupt environmental law to meet the challenges
of our day. 
I.  Is It Time to Say Goodbye to 
Environmental Law? 
Tis section was authored by Inara Scott, Gomo Family Pro-
fessor and Assistant Dean for Teaching and Learning Excel-
lence, College of Business, Oregon State University. 
Besides being a legal scholar, I also write fction. My frst 
published book was a young adult novel, and it was in pub-
lishing that I became familiar with the problem of shelv-
ing. You see, before you can sell your book, you have to 
identify the genre. Tat designation tells booksellers and 
librarians where to shelve the book; for e-books, it identi-
fes what category to put it in for online searching. 
If you can’t label it, they can’t sell it. 
Picking a genre determines how the book is marketed
and who becomes the audience. Genres also carry deeply
embedded connotations: for example, who do you pic-
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Te boundaries of genres can make it impossible to
write and sell certain kinds of stories. Understanding this,
authors consider where their books will be shelved before
they write, and modify their story ideas accordingly. Until
the 1970s, few books were written with teenage protago-
nists because there was no such genre as “young adult”— 
the genre of books for young people aged 12-18 was not
ofcially created until the 1960s.1 
Like fction authors, lawyers are trained to think about
law in discrete categories. Interdisciplinary eforts may be
viewed with skeptical or even disapproving eyes.2 As a pro-
fessor teaching environmental law at a business school, I
can say from frsthand experience that many do not con-
sider me to be part of the “environmental law” community
simply because of where I teach. 
Te Anthropocene—and, more specifcally, climate
change—ofer existential challenges to the survival of
humanity and life on this planet.3 Many instinctively turn
to environmental law to solve these challenges. Unfortu-
nately, I do not think the challenges we face will be solved
by items on the environmental law shelf. No, I believe we
need to start fresh, create a new genre, and leave environ-
mental law frmly in the past. 
To explain why, let’s start with what the environ-
mental law shelf currently contains. Most defnitions of
“environmental law” describe statutes and regulations
that govern how people interact with the natural environ-
ment—the “natural environment” in this context being
nonhuman species, plants, and natural resources.4 Envi-
ronmental law is also generally understood to include
pollution control and management of public lands and
natural resources. Te laws most would identify as the
canon of the environmental law genre (e.g., the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA), the Clean Air Act (CAA), and
the Clean Water Act (CWA))5 focus on this relatively
straightforward human-environment formula. Tese laws
generally arose out of a perceived environmental crisis, a
desire to protect the environment from human harm, and
1. Ashley Strickland, A Brief History of Young Adult Literature, CNN, Apr. 15, 
2015, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/living/young-adult-fction-evolu-
tion/index.html. 
2. Brian Tamanaha, Why the Interdisciplinary Movement in Legal Academia 
Might Be a Bad Idea (for Most Law Schools), Balkanization, Jan. 16, 2008, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/01/why-interdisciplinary-movement-in-
legal.html. 
3. Robert Macfarlane, Generation Anthropocene: How Humans Have Altered 
the Planet for Ever, Guardian, Apr. 1, 2016, https://www.theguardian. 
com/books/2016/apr/01/generation-anthropocene-altered-planet-for-ever; 
Will Stefen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 
115 PNAS 8252 (2018), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/ear-
ly/2018/08/07/1810141115.full. 
4. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Environmental Law, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/En-
vironmental_law (last edited Nov. 27, 2018). 
5. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18; 42 U.S.C. §§7401-
7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618; 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. 
FWPCA §§101-607. 
a need to ensure environmental resources were available
for human consumption. 
Over time, the popular understanding of environmental
law, including this human-environment formula, created
certain expectations for and limitations on the genre: 
1. Environmental law addresses interactions between
humans and the natural environment, and ways to
limit human actions in order to protect the environ-
ment. Conversely, environmental law does not focus
on human-to-human interactions or economic
transactions. Matters having to do with corporate
law, tax, and business are generally not included.
It is only recently that energy law—including fossil
fuel extraction and electric utility regulation—has
been considered alongside or even linked to envi-
ronmental law.6 
2. Environmental laws address narrow targets with nar-
row solutions. For example, the ESA creates a mech-
anism for protecting individual species. It was not
intended to create a mechanism for considering big-
ger questions (i.e., how do we protect biodiversity?).7 
3. Environmental law is furthered by liberal white activ-
ists. Environmental law is not relevant to conserva-
tives, people of color, or people living in urban settings
who do not like the woods.8 
Point number three is perhaps the most dangerous
aspect of the environmental law shelf. In a time of viru-
lent political division, environmental law, like anything
associated with climate change, is associated with one per-
spective and one political party.9 Sadly, it is also associated 
with one race and one socioeconomic status, and negatively
associated with strident activism.10 Overall, the percentage
6. Amy J. Wildermuth, Te Next Step: Te Integration of Energy Law and Envi-
ronmental Law, 31 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 369, 380-83 (2011). 
7. Sarah Gold, Te Endangered Species Act Won’t Save Animals. It’s Not Designed 
To., Slate, May 13, 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_sci-
ence/science/2017/05/the_endangered_species_act_wasn_t_meant_to_save_ 
the_animals.html; Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endan-
gered Species Act Doesn’t Work—And What to Do About It, 5 Conservation 
Biology 273, 275 (1991). 
8. Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism’s Racist History, New Yorker, Aug. 13, 2015, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/environmentalisms-racist-
history. 
9. Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental 
Issues, Pew Res. Center, Apr. 20, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-
issues/. 
10. Nicole Smith Dahmen, Te Overwhelming Whiteness of U.S. Environmentalism 
Is Hobbling the Fight Against Climate Change, Quartz, Jan. 4, 2017, https:// 
qz.com/877447/the-overwhelming-whiteness-of-the-us-environmentalist-
movement-is-hobbling-the-fght-against-climate-change/; Nadia Y. Bashir 
et al., Te Ironic Impact of Activists: Negative Stereotypes Reduce Social Change 
Infuence, 43 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 614, 624-25 (2013). 












































































Copyright © 2019 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
49 ELR 10040 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 1-2019 
of Americans identifying as environmentalists is down to
42% (from 78% in 1991).11 
So, at this point in history, what the public thinks of
as environmental law is law that does not address corpo-
rate governance or economic regulation; sees humans as
separate from and antagonistic to the “natural world”; is
narrowly focused on singular solutions in a complex world;
and is not relevant to a diversity of perspectives or identities. 
Te danger here should be obvious from this list: many
of the areas that currently fall out of the environmental law
arena are precisely the ones that are essential to addressing
the key challenges of the Anthropocene. Lawyers seeking
to mitigate climate change must embrace corporate law as
a key part of their toolbox.12 Shareholder primacy and cor-
porate law that fosters short-termism must be countered if
we are to fght overuse of natural resources and a culture
of unfettered consumerism.13 Smart infrastructure devel-
opment and management of the electricity sector is essen-
tial to decarbonizing our economy.14 Understanding how
to rethink the feld of economics could create a path for
sustainable development.15 
To be clear, I am not talking about simply rebranding
the environmental law shelf. Rather, just like the genre
“young adult” had to be created to allow for the fowering
of teenage literature, I believe we need to develop a new
term to describe the legal challenge ahead of us. 
I suggest we call this new genre “commons law.” 
By using the term “commons,” I hope to draw attention
to a few issues. First, I recognize that the traditional notion
of the commons is a resource shared by the public that is
not privately owned. However, commons law will refer to
regulation of public and privately owned resources. Why? 
In the Anthropocene, I believe we must confront the real-
ity that the earth is our commons, and whether activity
takes place on private or publicly owned land, it can have
signifcant impacts on all people. 
Second, I hope to call up two environmental law stal-
warts that may seem contradictory: Garret Hardin’s “Te
Tragedy of the Commons,” and Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel
Prize-winning work regarding the governing of the com-
mons.16 Hardin’s work is appropriate, because many would
say we are living proof of the tragedy that occurs when
communities share resources and individuals have the
incentive to overuse and pollute, rather than conserve.
11. Jefery M. Jones, Americans’ Identifcation as “Environmentalists” Down to 
42%, Gallup, Apr. 22, 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/190916/ameri-
cans-identifcation-environmentalists-down.aspx. 
12. Sarah E. Light, Te Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019), draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3228536. 
13. Roger L. Martin, Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem, Harv. Bus. Rev. Oct. 
9, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem. 
14. Granger Morgan et al., Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
The U.S. Electric Power Sector and Climate Change Mitigation
64 (2005), available at https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2005/06/ 
us-electric-power-sector-and-climate-change-mitigation.pdf. 
15. What on Earth Is the Doughnut?, Kate Raworth, https://www.kateraworth. 
com/doughnut/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
16. Garrett Hardin, Te Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-48 (1968); 
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Col-
lective Action (1990). 
Ostrom’s work is also appropriate, however, because she
provides a response to Hardin, ofering ways to govern
shared resources that do not end in collapse of the resource
and do not require privatization. 
Commons law must be broad, diverse, and big enough
to contain seeming contradictions. It must recognize that
creation of sustainable communities includes economic
activity and must include, or even focus on, the regulation
of this economic activity. It must address the governance of
corporations that control the majority of global resources
and threaten global ecosystems.17 It must also recognize
the value in nonhuman species, biodiversity, and the pres-
ervation of spaces that are free from human development. 
Commons law must be interdisciplinary and intersec-
tional. It must avoid the trap of zero-sum environmental-
ism by casting a wide net for stakeholders and developing
new legal tools that consider social justice alongside eco-
system protection.18 To meet the unique challenge of the
Anthropocene we need to start thinking outside the envi-
ronmental law shelf. 
Te canon of environmental law deserves a proud
place in environmental history for its contributions to our
planet. However, it does not serve us well as a model for the
Anthropocene. Moving forward, I believe we need to leave
environmental law to the past and start fresh. Educate new
lawyers, activists, and community members in a diferent
way of thinking, planning, and legislating. 
Te Anthropocene demands nothing less. 
II.  Aggressive Solutions to Disrupt 
Biodiversity Loss 
Tis section was authored by David Takacs, Professor of Law,
University of California Hastings College of the Law. 
Biodiversity is disappearing rapidly, portending grave
results not just for nonhuman species (and the popula-
tions and individuals that constitute them), but also for the
functioning ecosystems they constitute, and the human
communities that depend on diverse species and thriving
ecosystems—that is to say, all of us. It is perhaps the single
greatest problem our species faces.19 Even though 15% of
the earth’s land has designated formal protection, about
one-third of that land “is under intense human pressure,”20 
and only one-fourth of earth’s land surface remains free
from substantial human impacts.21 Such degradation
17. Andy Coghlan & Debora MacKenzie, Revealed—Te Capitalist Network 
Tat Runs the World, New Scientist, Oct. 19, 2011, https://www.new-
scientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network-
that-runs-the-world/. 
18. Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ELR 10328 
(Apr. 2017). 
19. Global Biodiversity Continues to Decline, According to New Reports From 
IPBES, Int’l Sci. Council, Mar. 23, 2018, https://council.science/current/ 
news/global-biodiversity-continues-to-decline-according-to-new-reports-
from-ipbes. 
20. Kendall R. Jones et al., One-Tird of Global Protected Land Is Under Intense 
Human Pressure, 360 Science 788 (2018). 
21. Global Biodiversity Continues to Decline, According to New Reports From 
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harms the well-being of more than three billion people,
and consumes more than 10% of annual global gross prod-
uct through loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.22 
Only 13.2% of oceans are “wilderness,” and only 4.9% of
those areas are within protected areas.23 
While cultivation (agriculture, ranching, and for-
estry) and direct exploitation remain the gravest harms to
biodiversity,24 climate change increasingly threatens bio-
diversity as species are unable to adapt to a rapidly and
chaotically changing world: our current, static methods of
conserving species become increasingly inadequate if we do
not preserve or restore habitats that species will need in a
climate-addled future.25 
We have made strides making laws that constrain
humans from wantonly destroying everything. Te need
for conservation is a customary norm around the world.
Nearly all nations have acceded to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, and nearly all nations make some
attempts to preserve their genetic heritage, with laws that
sustain endangered species and/or protect land important
to vital ecosystems and the biodiversity they sustain. 
But the cataclysm of species annihilation proceeds
apace. According to the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature (IUCN), more than 26,000 species are
threatened with extinction, including 41% of amphibian
species, 24% of mammal species, and 13% of bird species
facing grave extinction threats.26 Te human population is
projected to grow to nine billion by 2050 and likely to 11
billion by 2100,27 while the average person’s buying power
and consumption will grow by 150%. Our laws to conserve
are not keeping pace with our drive to destroy. 
To stave of a disastrous disruption in human and non-
human survival, law needs to evolve quickly and radically.
I am not challenging current legal foci on endangered spe-
cies and protected lands, which, at least, concentrate easy-
to-identify entities (I do know what a bald eagle is, but
might have trouble drawing the parameters of a given eco-
system type), and has meant that some species that would
otherwise be gone still live alongside us. We can certainly
exponentially ramp up what we have been doing.28 Nor am
I advocating one or more of the following legal disruptions
22. Summary for Policymakers of the Tematic Assessment of Land Degradation 
and Restoration, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services, Doc. IPBES/6/L.9/Rev.1 (2018), https://council. 
science/cms/2018/03/ipbes-6-l9_en.pdf. 
23. Kendall R. Jones et al., Te Location and Protection Status of Earth’s Dimin-
ishing Marine Wilderness, 28 Current Biology 2506 (2018). 
24. Sean L. Maxwell et al., Biodiversity: Te Ravages of Guns, Nets, and Bulldoz-
ers, 536 Nature 143 (2016). 
25. Wendy B. Foden et al., Identifying the World’s Most Climate Change Vul-
nerable Species: A Systematic Trait-Based Assessment of All Birds, Amphibians, 
and Corals, PLOS One, June 12, 2013, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ 
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0065427. 
26. Te IUCN Red List of Treatened Species, Home Page, https://www.iuc-
nredlist.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
27. Damian Carrington, World Population to Hit 11bn in 2100—With 70% 
Chance of Continuous Rise, Guardian, Sept. 18, 2014. 
28. Jessica Owley & David Takacs, Flexible Conservation in Uncertain Times, 
in Contemporary Issues in Climate Change Law and Policy: Essays 
Inspired by the IPCC 65 (Robin Kundis Craig & Stephen R. Miller eds., 
Envtl. L. Inst. 2016). 
as the ones we ought to choose. But we do have to rethink,
drastically, our current approaches to living alongside bio-
diversity if we are to have ample biodiversity among which
to live, and if human civilization is to be sustained in some
recognizable form. 
E.O. Wilson and other prominent conservation biolo-
gists proposed setting aside “half for nature.”29 Protected
areas do help biodiversity survive. If done smartly30—with
careful planning to conserve megadiverse areas that human
communities depend upon for local and global ecosystem
services—biologists estimate we could steward 85% of
nonhuman species while sustaining the human communi-
ties that depend upon them.31 
Tis would also require that the law evolve from a
static conception of species and landscapes—put a fence
around an area, manage species in forms and places they
have long been—to a more dynamic form grounded in
pinpoint adaptive management. We would need to think
about maintaining evolutionary potential outside of for-
mally protected areas so that species could migrate, and
develop nimble systems for prioritizing high-level protec-
tion as areas formally protected for species no longer suit
their needs in a changing climate. Law would need to
specify performance standards for areas and species of con-
cern (i.e., ecological indicators or benchmarks that must
be met), and, if not, required pathways to change how we
are doing what we are doing. Managers would constantly
be measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying in
accordance with the standards.32 Tis would also result in
greater employment for local people as biodiversity manag-
ers, green jobs rooted in caring for the earth. 
Current eforts to conceptualize and operationalize
“nature’s contributions to people” broaden our notion of
“ecosystem services.”33 Including harder-to-quantify con-
tributions of biodiversity to our well-being may result in
being more inclusive in who gets to defne what those
contributions are, and thus what should be preserved. For
selected areas, law might provide management autonomy
with transfer of property rights for local guardians with
a track record of care and stewardship. Law would need
to be nimble and place-specifc about who are the legally
mandated managers, who monitors that performance stan-
dards are being met, and what are the legal consequences
for derogation from those standards. 
Concerted, focused, efective eforts to stave of biodi-
versity loss will likely be very, very expensive. To aford this,
particularly in the global South (but even in the North,
where no country comes close to preserving “half the
earth,” or are successfully staunching species loss), would
be to take the legal principle of common but diferenti-
29. Half-Earth Project, Home Page, https://www.half-earthproject.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 26, 2018). 
30. James E.M. Watson et al., Te Performance and Potential of Protected Areas, 
515 Nature 67 (2014). 
31. Half-Earth Project, supra note 29. 
32. David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and 
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 653 (2013). 
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ated responsibilities (CBDR) seriously.34 Wealthy countries
(and individuals) have become wealthy by exploiting lands
and species of the South (or by exploiting other citizens)
without proper compensation. Te same entities have pol-
luted the global atmospheric commons without paying for
the externalities of that pollution. 
Laws implementing CBDR would alleviate the poverty
that requires the poor to degrade nonhuman landscapes,
and to pay for land and species conservation, including
employment for a cadre of conservation professionals and
paraprofessionals. All of this could be abetted by negotiat-
ing a new multilateral environmental agreement to replace
the weak voluntary commitments embedded in the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, or by amending that agree-
ment to put some teeth into it, including requirements to
implement CBDR aggressively. 
Law has begun, increasingly, to ask those who degrade
the global environment to pay for such degradation. Under
the aegis of the polluter-pays principle, REDD+ (reduc-
ing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation)
allows greenhouse gas polluters to “ofset” their pollution
by investing in reforestation or avoiding deforestation,
allowing trees to work their photosynthetic magic by suck-
ing up carbon dioxide (CO2).
35 Biodiversity ofsetting takes
this logic one step further, by asking developers to ofset
damage to targeted species or ecosystems by paying others
elsewhere to conserve those species.36 
Both practices are controversial; but to stave of mass
extinctions, when done right and on a large, monitored
scale, market mechanisms could inject many billions of
dollars into government conservation cofers, particularly
to incentivize conservation on private lands (where other-
wise conservation would not occur). State-of-the-art col-
laborations between regional planners, social scientists,
community groups representing disparate interests, clima-
tologists, and conservation biologists could predict where
species and ecosystems might likely migrate, predict where
human communities are likely to expand, and prioritize
migration corridors that will allow natural communities
to adapt to climate change; market mechanisms can direct
and prioritize conservation in these areas. 
Desperate and wildly ecologically changing times
require us to rethink all of our notions of what “belongs”
where. Law could permit and defne parameters on aggres-
sive conservation translocation. In a paradigm change
from traditional static notions of biodiversity conservation,
we might assist colonization and introduce species to where
they had historically been, exporting species from places
where habitat no longer exists or soon will not exist due to
changing climates or growing human demands.37 
34. David Takacs, Forest Carbon Projects and International Law: A Deep Equity 
Legal Analysis, 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 521 (2010). 
35. Id. 
36. David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Ofsetting and the Law, 26 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 161 (2018). 
37. Philip J. Seddon et al., Te Risks of Assisted Colonization, 23 Conservation 
Biology 788 (2009). 
Tese can be reintroductions to where species have been
and now disappeared, or reinforcement of individuals
into existing populations of that species. Te “rewilding”
movement focuses on top carnivores whose (re)introduc-
tion revitalizes ecosystem functions and augments species
diversity.38 Such programs could also consider introduc-
ing species that have not existed in a place; that would be
“invasive,” but nonetheless might have some chance of ful-
flling ecological roles and adaptation to the onslaught of
climate change.39 
And given that we are already radically altering what
may exist and where, we might use genetic manipulation or
“rescue” for endangered species. Taking this one step fur-
ther, we could resuscitate extinct species through genetic
manipulation.40 So, for example, organizations like Revive
& Restore seek “de-extinction,” the return of the woolly
mammoth, passenger pigeon, and heath hen through tissue
biobanking, intense genetic (re)sequencing, and cloning.41 
A diferent line of thinking suggests that radical conser-
vation interventions—put a fence around half the earth’s
surface, manipulate the genetic endowment of life—are
dystopic interventions that totally miss the point that pov-
erty and inequality drive biodiversity loss, and that “put a
fence around and protect it” conservation leads to human
dislocations, political upheaval, and general human mis-
ery.42 Te only sustainable way to maintain nonhuman
communities (and thus human communities) is to change
the paradigmatic drive toward ever-greater economic
growth that inevitably degrades ecological and human
capital, and to transfuse wealth from overconsuming rich
to disenfranchised poor, North to South. 
Te ultimate sustainable route to biodiversity conserva-
tion is through what I call “deep equity” (i.e., a fundamen-
tal change in what we value and how we operationalize
those values in law).43 Deeply equitable solutions maximize
and synergize individual, community, and nonhuman
health and potential. Such values, as they become deeply
rooted in societies, would also become deeply rooted in
those societies’ laws, creating a virtuous circle. One such
value change might be refected were we to give various
diferent biological (or nonbiological) entities fundamen-
tal rights, refecting our expanding conception of beings to
whom we owe ethical obligations, with laws implementing
those obligations.44 Or, simply, the wealthy need to con-
38. Video: How Wolves Change Rivers (Sustainable Human 2014), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q. 
39. IUCN, Guidelines for Reintroductions and Other Conservation 
Translocations (2013), https://portals.iucn.org/library/efles/documents/
2013-009.pdf; Maya L. Kapoor, Should We Relocate Species Tat Can’t Keep 
Up With Climate Change?, Mother Jones, Aug. 26, 2018. 
40. Steph Yin, Scientists See Promise in Resurrecting Tese Rhinos Tat Are Nearly 
Extinct, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/ 
science/northern-white-rhinoceros-resurrecting.html. 
41. Revive & Restore, Home Page, https://reviverestore.org/ (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018). 
42. Bram Büscher et al., Half Earth or Whole Earth? Radical Ideas for Conserva-
tion, and Teir Implications, 51 Oryx 407 (2017). 
43. Takacs, supra note 34. 
44. Jens Benöhr & Patrick J. Lynch, Should Rivers Have Rights? A Growing Movement 
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sume much, much less than current rates, refecting the
urgency of our situation. 
But law evolves slowly, and we are unlikely to pursue
many of these in the short term, and in the long term
it may be too late to preserve large swathes of function-
ing ecosystems or the magnifcent creatures that inhabit
them, or to save our own species that ineluctably depends
upon these ecosystems. And that is the ultimate disrup-
tion that environmental law has thus far been ill-equipped
to prevent. 
III.  Now Is the Moment! 
Tis section was authored by Rebecca Bratspies, Professor of
Law at the City University of New York School of Law and
the Founding Director of the Center for Urban Environmen-
tal Reform. 
Te choreographer George Balanchine is famous for tell-
ing his dancers, “Why are you holding back? What are you
saving for—for another time? Tere are no other times.
Tere is only now. Right now.”45 
While dance and environmental law are generally not
considered the most closely aligned felds, I have been
thinking about Balanchine’s words lately as I try to respond
to the current administration’s approach to climate change,
and to environmental law more generally. 
On October 6, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a report titled Global
Warming of 1.5°C.46 Tis report underscores the vital
importance of “now” that Balanchine was trying to con-
vey to his dancers. Te report emphasized that the world
is not yet committed to catastrophe—it is still possible to
keep anthropogenic climate change below 1.5°C of warm-
ing.47 However, there is only a small window of time in
which we can change our trajectory and limit the damages
of climate change. Tus, the IPCC unambiguously states
that the need for immediate action is urgent and that avert-
ing catastrophe will require “rapid and far-reaching transi-
tions” that “are unprecedented in terms of scale.”48 Tere
are no other times. Tere is only now. Right now! 
Te U.S. national government seems set on preventing
any such transition. Announcing with great fanfare that
the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, the Donald Trump Administration is on the wrong
side of history. Indeed, the government’s own reporting
underscores just how dangerous that climate denial has
become. Te Fourth National Climate Assessment, qui-
etly released the day after Tanksgiving, painted a clear
features/should-rivers-have-rights-a-growing-movement-says-its-about-
time. 
45. Margaret Fuhrer, Te Best Balanchine Quotes in Honor of Mr. B.’s Birthday, 
DanceSpirit, Jan. 22, 2018, https://www.dancespirit.com/balanchine-
quotes-birthday-2527739325.html. 
46. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ 
sr15/. 
47. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers A.3 
(2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_fnal.pdf. 
48. Id. at C.2. 
picture of the climate change impacts “already being
felt in communities across the country.”49 Nevertheless,
with climate deniers occupying key executive branch
positions,50 the Administration alternates between bol-
stering the coal industry,51 undoing laws preventing
methane and hydrofuorocarbon emissions, and reducing
fuel efciency standards.52 
Indeed, the Trump Administration recently used the
prediction that disastrous warming was inevitable as a rea-
son to allow increased carbon emissions from vehicles. Not-
ing that the proposed rollback was “projected to result in
only very minor increases in global CO2 concentrations and
associated impacts,”53 the Administration rationalized that
any such restrictions were too small to matter because cli-
mate change is a global issue. Tis was, of course, precisely
the argument rejected in Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency.54 In that case, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had argued that because green-
house gas emissions caused widespread harm, there was
no “realistic possibility . . . that the relief petitioners seek
would mitigate global climate change and remedy their
injuries.”55 Te U.S. Supreme Court fatly rejected this
contention, noting that “the United States transportation
sector emits an enormous quality of carbon dioxide”56 and
that restricting these emissions would be an incremental
step that might reduce the risk to some extent.57 
Yet even as the federal government backslides, large
portions of the country are forging ahead. All eyes are
on the cities, states, businesses, and other organs of civil
society that have pledged to take action on their own.
Te 3,600-member strong We Are Still In58 coalition, for
example, has taken up the task of achieving the United
States’ nationally determined contribution to the Paris
Agreement59 without federal leadership. Hundreds of
subnational and private actors have submitted pledges to
reduce their carbon emissions. Tese commitments put us
on track to come close to achieving our Paris obligations.
And technology is rapidly leaving carbon behind. Even
49. US Global Climate Research Program, Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in 
the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Summary 
Findings 1 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/. 
50. Rebecca Bratspies, Te Climate for Human Rights, 72 Miami L. Rev. 308
(2018) (listing climate deniers in key administration positions). 
51. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing 
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 
(proposed Aug. 31, 2018). 
52. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement for the Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient 
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and 
Light Trucks (2018). 
53. Id. at 8-73. 
54. 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007). 
55. Id. at 518-21. 
56. Id. at 524-25. 
57. Id. 
58. We Are Still In, Home Page, https://www.wearestillin.com (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018). 
59. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Unit-
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in the United States, renewables and electric cars are bur-
geoning, prompting the Climate Action Tracker to revise
the United States’ projected emissions downward despite
federal intransigence.60 “Tere are no other times. Tere is
only now. Right now!” 
Moreover, the rest of the world seems committed to a 
greener future. A Dutch appeals court ordered the Nether-
lands to ratchet up its climate ambitions.61 A host of simi-
lar lawsuits around the globe are pushing other countries 
to do the same.62 Tese lawsuits are changing the public 
narrative. Together with the IPCC report emphasizing 
that we are not yet committed to 1.5°C, the message is 
being heard: “Tere are no other times. Tere is only now. 
Right now!” 
Perhaps the greatest signal that we may be experienc-
ing a sea change is the emerging consensus on the human
right to a healthy environment. On October 25, 2018, the
United Nations special rapporteur for human rights and
the environment addressed the United Nations General
Assembly for the frst time.63 While the United States did
not attend, many other countries did. Costa Rica, Slove-
nia, and Switzerland spoke strongly in favor of ofcially
recognizing a human right to a healthy environment. Rus-
sia prefaced its remarks by stating that the Russian Federa-
tion recognized the right to a healthy environment. France
has proposed its Global Compact for the Environment,
which it describes as a “common road map for transform-
ing our world.”64 
Together, these developments suggest that there is a
moment open for action. Te U.S. mid-term elections gave
us a hint of how the federal government might move for-
ward. Just weeks after Democrats gained 40 U.S. House of
Representatives seats, the U.S. Congress got its frst bipar-
tisan climate proposal in recent memory. Spearheaded by
Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), the Energy Innovation and Cli-
mate Dividend Act65 would reduce U.S. carbon emissions
by 90% by 2015. Given hostility in the U.S. Senate and a
president who tweets that every periodic cold spell proves
that global warming is a hoax,66 federal action remains
60. Climate Action Tracker, USA, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/ 
usa/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
61. Netherlands/Urgenda Found., Hague Court of Appeal, 9 Oct. 2018, No. 
200.178.245/01, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=EC 
LI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610. 
62. Urgenda, Global Climate Litigation, https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/ 
climate-case/global-climate-litigation/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
63. David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environ-
ment, Address at the 73d Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewsID=23789&LangID=E. 
64. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York, Te 
Global Pact for the Environment, https://onu.delegfrance.org/Te-Global-
Pact-for-the-Environnement (last modifed July 17, 2018). 
65. Energy Innovation and Climate Dividend Act, 115th Cong, 2d Sess. (Nov. 
28, 2018) https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfles/energy_innovation_ 
and_carbon_dividend_act_-_deutch.pdf. 
66. Tom Embury-Dennis, Trump Confuses Climate Change With Weather, Prompt-
ing Widespread Despair, The Independent, Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-tweet-global-warming-climate-
change-thanksgiving-driving-trafc-a8646081.html; see also Dylan Mat-
thews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115 Times. 
Here’s All of Tem, Vox, June 1, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
unlikely. Yet regardless of federal action or inaction, we can
seize the chance, we can remake our world. Now is the
time to think big, to think beyond the narrowing limits of
existing environmental law to what a truly sustainable soci-
ety would entail. Tere are no other times. Tere is only
now. Right now! 
IV.  Liquid Business 
Tis section was authored by Vanessa Casado Pérez, Associate
Professor of Law and Research Associate Professor of Agricul-
tural Economics, Texas A&M University School of Law. 
Te aphorism “water is the new oil” is now truer than it
has ever been. While many use the phrase to suggest that
water is as scarce and valuable as oil once was, it is also true
in another sense: speculation in water markets now rivals
speculation in oil markets. Oddly, however, water scarcity
has not translated into a higher price for water, as it has done
in oil. But this anomaly may be on the verge of changing
as international investors start to enter the business of cli-
mate change.67 From oil tycoons like T. Boone Pickens68 to
international hedge funds,69 investment in all things water
is on the rise. And while many deny climate change, the
market does not. Since climate change is widely expected
to induce scarcity in water supplies, business investments
in the water market are increasing rapidly.70 
Te alarm has gone of. Tose who believe markets
should not commodify water are appalled by the role that
investment moguls play: all the investments in the water
business may lead to price increases for water. Tere is some
merit in valuing water as a scarce resource so that we do not
misuse it. Te more expensive it is, the shorter our showers
would be and the more thoughtful the choice of crops and
irrigation techniques will be. 
But using the market to allocate water also gives rise 
to two concerns: the afordability crisis for low-income 
populations, and the inability to capture certain intangible 
values, such as environmental protection, in a single mon-
etary price.71 Te frst concern is often answered by say-
ing that the amount of water needed to satisfy our basic 
needs is around 1% of the total water used, so we could let 
the market deal with the rest and fgure out how to allo-
politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate-
agreement. 
67. McKenzie Funk, Windfall: The Booming Business of Global Warm-
ing (2014). Nonetheless, the very term “water market” is ambiguous. Tose 
who criticize water markets often confate trading of water rights with priva-
tization of water utilities. Tat is a mistake. It is both too broad, in that it 
encompasses more than trading the water itself, and too narrow, in that 
water investors look beyond water rights and water utilities to things like 
water conservation and wastewater. Vanessa Casado Pérez, The Role of 
Government in Water Markets 15-16 (2017). 
68. Sandi Zellmer, Te Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Col-
laborative Water Management, 8 Nev. L.J. 994, 999 (2008). 
69. Abrahm Lustgarten & Propublica, A Free-Market Plan to Save the American West 
From Drought, Atlantic, Mar. 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2016/03/a-plan-to-save-the-american-west-from-drought/426846/. 
70. Zellmer, supra note 68, at 995. 
71. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Missing Water Markets: A Cautionary Tale of Govern-
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cate the 1% cheaply.72 Environmental regulations, such as 
water quality or minimum instream fows, could address 
the second. 
While the answers to these concerns may not be reas-
suring, we should take comfort in the fact that water is
somewhat speculation-resistant,73 at least compared to oil.
Unlike oil regulation, the regulation of markets for water
rights has built-in mechanisms to prevent speculation.
Tese constraints in water markets have driven investments
toward related industries, like water conservation technol-
ogy or reuse. 
Water rights can be traded in the western United
States and in other jurisdictions such as Australia or
Chile. Trade includes leases and sales of water rights
that give the buyer the right to use water if it is avail-
able. Generally, the transactions are subject to two lay-
ers of protection. Te frst is administrative review of the
transaction. Transactions are not approved if they injure
third parties or the environment and, thus, are often sub-
ject to the approval of an administrative agency. Water
rights are defned across several variables, including the
point of diversion and the type of use. A transaction will
normally imply a change in either or both of those vari-
ables. A common transaction might be one between an
agricultural right holder and an urban consumer, because
the latter often has a higher willingness to pay and a less
elastic demand curve. In the U.S. West, these types of
transactions have brought fexibility to water allocation
systems, where the majority of water rights were allo-
cated when agriculture was the main economic activity
and large cities and suburban areas with luscious lawns
had not developed. Tose transactions should make the
farmer realize the opportunity cost of using water. 
Another layer of protection, and more relevant for the
purposes of speculation, is the forfeiture provision included
in all prior appropriation states and many other jurisdic-
tions. Tese forfeiture provisions mandate that holders of
water rights use the water. If they do not use it for a certain
period, usually around fve years, they may lose the water
right.74 So, unlike with real estate or stocks and bonds,
where owners can wait for the market to peak and then sell
their assets, in water markets, owners cannot engage in this
kind of “wait and see.” Tat said, if water becomes valuable
enough, investors may fnd a way around these rules. One
company, Water Asset Management, is taking that route— 
considering land an accessory. It focuses on water itself but
to get to it, it buys land and it tries to make use of the land
to break even.75 
Te question is whether there is something that water
law could do to stop big players from dominating the water
72. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Go With the Flow: Lessons From Water Management 
and Water Markets, in Governing Access to Essential Resources 241 
(Katharina Pistor & Olivier De Schutter eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016). 
See also Buzz Tompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 Marq. L. Rev.
17, 38 (2011). 
73. Zellmer, supra note 68, at 997-98. 
74. Id. at 1005. 
75. Lustgarten & Propublica, supra note 69. 
market broadly understood, beyond the forfeiture provision
and the approval requirements. It can. Further, water law
may be able to target the surrounding industries in which
investors are interested. First, regulators could limit the
number of shares a single entity could accumulate. One of
the main fears is a market dominated by big players. While
antitrust regulations are set up to deal with monopolistic
practices that harm the consumer, water law can take a
page from other natural resources markets and avoid con-
centration by limiting the amount of water rights that can
be accumulated in the same hands. In fsheries’ individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) programs, there are limits on
the shares of the total allowable catch that a single ITQ
owner can acquire.76 Tis should prevent the concentra-
tion of the agricultural industry in a few hands and avoid
displacing local farmers. 
Second, groundwater should be subject to a permit
system like surface water is.77 Investment companies 
are keen on exploiting lax regulations, and have noticed
that in many places groundwater may be more readily
accessible as an investment.78 Te separate regulation
of a unique resource of surface and groundwater denies
the science and makes both, given their interconnec-
tion, overexploited. 
Tird, wastewater regulation needs to be properly
designed. As it stands today, return fow belongs to the
user who diverted the water. A city may have a water right
and divert water from the river. Te city does not consume
all of it. It usually treats the wastewater and sends it back
to the river, where downstream users use it. But if a city
decided to reuse wastewater before bringing it back to the
river, it could do so, leaving downstream users without the
water they have relied on for decades.79 In some states like
Arizona, cities may be able to not only reuse it in their area,
but to sell the water as a commodity because cleaned-up
wastewater is considered a new product. While incentives
to invest in reuse are paramount, water regulations need
to better address the efect on downstream users and the
ecosystem needs. 
An adage seems appropriate to close. Mark Twain pur-
portedly said, “Whisky is for drinking and water is for
fghting.” Water scarcity will certainly cause fghts, as there
will not be enough water for all users. Given the business of
water in times of climate change, the question that lingers
is whether small water right holders and the environment
can put up a fght against these powerful businesses. Te
three water law measures stated in this essay may be able
to help. 
76. Katrina Wyman, Second Generation Property Rights, Nat. Resources J.
(forthcoming 2018) (on fle with the author). 
77. Barton H. Tompson Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional 
Conjunctive Management, 47 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 275 (2011). 
78. Tate Dwinnell, T. Boone Pickens Invests in Water—Should You?, Seeking Alpha,
Jan. 17, 2007, https://seekingalpha.com/article/24410-t-boone-pickens-
invests-in-water-should-you. 
79. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Inefcient Efciency: Crying Over Spilled Water, 46 
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V.  Does the President Really Matter to 
U.S. Participation in International 
Environmental Law? A View From the 
Perspective of Oceans Law 
Tis section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, James I.
Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Tis research was made
possible, in part, through generous support from the Albert
and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. 
How much do presidents really matter to the United States’
participation in international environmental law? 
Fairly obviously, presidential turnovers in the United
States are absolutely critical to how the United States
conducts its international relations. President George W.
Bush’s pursuit of Middle Eastern terrorists in the wake of
9/11, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, represents a
far diferent engagement with the rest of the world regard-
ing international terrorism than President Barack Obama’s
reliance on drones and attempts to bring American troops
back home. In turn, President Obama’s engagement with
the rest of the world on climate change, including commit-
ting the United States to the Paris Agreement, represents
a radically diferent path than the one President Trump
has thus far chosen to walk with regard to the same issue.
Indeed, President Trump’s “America First” approach to
international relations shows every sign of becoming one of
the most idiosyncratic periods in the United States’ presi-
dentially driven relations with the rest of the world since at
least the conclusion of World War II. 
But how much does any of that matter to the United
States’ participation in international environmental law? 
Te issue, of course, is that the U.S. Constitution for-
mulates treaty-making as a two-body problem: the presi-
dent negotiates and signs, while the Senate advises and
consents.80 Failure of the United States to participate in
international environmental law can occur at either stage.
For example, President William Clinton signed81 but Con-
gress refused to ratify82 the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (to which the United States remains, at least for
now, a Party). Indeed, as of late August 2018, according
to the U.S. Department of State, presidents have sent 42
treaties to the Senate that still await the Senate’s advice and
consent to ratifcation.83 
One of these 42 treaties is the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).84 President Ronald
80. U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
81. Press Release, Environmental Defense Fund, President Clinton Signs 
Climate Treaty (Nov. 12, 1998), https://www.edf.org/news/president-
clinton-signs-climate-treaty. 
82. Christie Aschwanden, A Lesson From Kyoto’s Failure: Don’t Let Congress Touch a 
Climate Deal, FiveThirtyEight, Dec. 4, 2015, https://fvethirtyeight.com/ 
features/a-lesson-from-kyotos-failure-dont-let-congress-touch-a-climate-
deal/. 
83. U.S. Department of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate, https://www.state. 
gov/s/l/treaty/pending/ (last updated Aug. 28, 2018). 
84. Id. ¶ 12. 
Reagan refused to sign the treaty when it opened for signa-
ture while he was in ofce, but President Clinton signed it
on July 29, 1994.85 It has been sitting with the Senate since
October 7, 199486—that is, through Presidents Clinton,
Bush II, Obama, and, so far, Trump. Clearly, the identity
of the chief executive has not mattered much to the United
States’ failure to ratify. 
Perhaps perversely, however, the United States’ non-
ratifcation and the identity of the chief executive also do
not seem to have mattered all that much to the treaty’s
operation—including in U.S. waters. Of the 193 United
Nations Member States, 168 (including the European
Union) have ratifed this “constitution for the ocean,”87 
which went into efect on November 16, 1994.88 Te 
United States follows LOSC’s jurisdictional provisions
on the grounds that they are customary international law.
Indeed, after refusing to sign the treaty, President Rea-
gan frst proclaimed a 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone for the United States, in March 1983,89 then
in December 1988 added a 12-nautical-mile territorial
sea90—both exactly as LOSC allows. 
All subsequent presidents have accepted these proclama-
tions. Finishing up, in September 1999, President Clinton
proclaimed a contiguous zone for the United States out to
24 nautical miles91—and, again, all subsequent presidents
have accepted that declaration. In addition, the United
States ratifed the supplemental Agreement for the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in August 1996,
and this treaty came into force on December 11, 2001.92 
Te United States has perhaps been most out of step with
the rest of the world with regard to rights in the seabed. In
September 1945, more than a decade before the frst law
of the sea conventions opened for signature in 1958, Presi-
85. See id. (noting the signing date, which is when President Clinton was in 
ofce, but also noting that the treaty opened for signature in 1982, when 
President Reagan was in ofce). 
86. Id. 
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Status of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement Relating to the Imple-
mentation of Part XI of the Convention, and of the Agreement for the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
(2018) [hereinafter UNCLOS Status Chart], http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
reference_fles/status2018.pdf. Tommy T.B. Koh, president of the Tird 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, described the treaty as “a 
Constitution for the Oceans” in the fnal meetings of the conference. Tom-
my T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks at the Tird United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 6 & 11, 1982), available 
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english. 
pdf. 
88. UNCLOS Status Chart, supra note 87. 
89. Proclamation No. 5030: Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States 
of America, 97 Stat. 1557 (1983), available at https://www.boem.gov/ 
US-Mexico-Presidential-Proclamation-5030/. 
90. Proclamation No. 5928: Territorial Sea of the United States, 193 Stat. 
2981 (1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. 
php?pid=35297. 
91. Proclamation No. 7219: Contiguous Zone of the United States, 113 Stat. 
2138 (1999), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1999-
09-06/pdf/WCPD-1999-09-06-Pg1684.pdf. 
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dent Harry Truman proclaimed the United States’ asser-
tion of control over its continental shelf93—a post-World
War II recognition of the importance of ofshore oil and
gas reserves. Te United States’ most prominent objection
to ratifying LOSC was its treatment of the deep seabed
(denominated “Te Area”) and its minerals as “the com-
mon heritage of mankind.” However, deep seabed mining
is just now getting underway, and even then, so far, it is
taking place only on the deeper parts of continental shelves
controlled by coastal nations (gold and copper deposits of 
the coast of Papua New Guinea94 and iron sands of the
coast of New Zealand95). As a result, the United States’
objection might be regarded as 40 years premature. 
Even with respect to the seabed, however, the United
States is beginning to behave like the rest of the world.
Specifcally, the United States is mapping its extended con-
tinental shelf in the Arctic Ocean in conformance with
LOSC96—even though our non-ratifcation of the treaty
means that we cannot submit a claim to that extended
shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf.97 Moreover, U.S. companies like Lockheed Martin
prefer the legal safety of LOSC when pursuing deep sea-
bed mining; indeed, Lockheed Martin formed a United
Kingdom (U.K.) subsidiary, UK Seabed Resources, so that
it could receive its mining licenses from the International
Seabed Authority pursuant to the treaty.98 Such industry
preferences and the United States’ interest in the Arctic
might fnally induce the Senate to ratify the treaty. 
Maybe. Te larger point here, however, is that the United
States’ relationship to LOSC has been more or less the same
since President Reagan, despite the fact that he did not sign
the treaty and President Clinton did. Part of the reason, no
doubt, is that President Dwight Eisenhower signed, and
the Senate under new-President John Kennedy ratifed, the
four 1958 United Nations conventions on the law of the
sea,99 which set forth many of the same kinds of obligations
and rights as the 1982 LOSC. Another part, no doubt, is
93. Proclamation No. 2667: Policy of the United States With Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 
Fed. Reg. 12305 (Sept. 28, 1945), available at https://www.gc.noaa.gov/ 
documents/gcil_proc_2667.pdf. 
94. Fatima Arkin, Sea Mining Project Of Papua New Guinea Hits Choppy Wa-
ters, Eco-Business, Feb. 19, 2018, https://www.eco-business.com/news/ 
sea-mining-project-of-papua-new-guinea-hits-choppy-waters/. 
95. Kiwis Against Seabed Mining, What Is Seabed Mining?, http://kasm.org.nz/ 
seabed-mining/what-is-seabed-mining/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
96. Lauren Steenson, Mapping the Extended Continental Shelf in the Arc-
tic, Coast Guard Compass, Nov. 28, 2016, http://coastguard.dodlive. 
mil/2016/11/mapping-the-extended-continental-shelf-in-the-arctic/. 
97. See Division for Ocean Afairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), http://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm (updated July 17, 2018). 
98. Lockheed Martin, UK Seabed Resources, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/ 
en-gb/products/uk-seabed-resources.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
99. Te four 1958 conventions are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, text and status available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033c69; the Convention on the High 
Sea, text and status available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails. 
aspx?objid=080000028003327e; the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas, text and status available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033df;
and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, text and status available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800338fb. 
that the new jurisdictional provisions in LOSC, and many
other of its provisions, work to the United States’ advan-
tage. But an important part of the reason is that Senate
procedures and politics—not presidential inclination—has
been an efective roadblock to ratifcation,100 underscoring
the basic constitutional point that the United States’ assent
and strict adherence to international environmental law is
only partially a matter of who the president is. 
VI.  Learning From Local Response to 
Environmental Disruption 
Tis section was authored by Keith Hirokawa, Professor of
Law, Albany Law School; and Jonathan Rosenbloom, Dwight
D. Opperman Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake Univer-
sity Law School. 
A brief perusal of the history of environmental law illus-
trates the ways law might be employed to sufer through
a constant state of disruption. In the past, we have largely
relied on state and federal environmental legislation and
regulation to accomplish the task, in part because of a fear
that local governments will “race to the bottom” and take a
competitive advantage against their more regulation-prone
neighbors.101 We would suggest that the reliance on state
and federal regulation, as well as the lack of confdence in
local governance, has served to undermine sincere dialogue
on the potential of local government to govern well both
within and across boundaries. 
Te present circumstance of climate and ecological dis-
ruption will provide an opportunity to revisit the issue of
local environmental law. Specifcally, climate change will
require more engagement with local governments because
of the local stakes involved. Given current and likely future
disruptions from rising sea levels, heat waves, and storm
events, local governments will be faced with coastline inse-
curity, vulnerable infrastructure and difculties in meet-
ing essential human needs, geological instability, uncertain
ecological changes (such as invasive species), water scarcity,
and population migration. Such changes will permeate
social, economic, and environmental expectations in every
community. Given the role that local governments play in
responding to challenges to local quality of life and secu-
rity, local governments will inevitably become players. 
Tere are and will be instances where local governments
manipulate social, economic, and environmental resources
to protect their own. But there are and will be examples
that illustrate the contrary. Some local governments forgo
regulation of extraction and resource development, while
100. For recent arguments against ratifcation, see Teodore R. Bromund et al., 
7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Heritage Found., July 4, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/ 
commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-
sea. 
101. We also note that it is due, in part, to lack of resources. Local governments 
are tasked with critical functions such as safety (e.g., police/fre/hospitals), 
education, provision of potable water, and waste removal, but in many cases 
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others will adopt more comprehensive land use regulations
that maintain ecosystem services and other quality-of-life
determinants. But diferences in local governance are nei-
ther surprising nor unwarranted—governments illustrate
legitimacy though responsiveness to local needs, and local
needs difer across boundaries. More importantly, norms
and values develop in very local ways, and it would be a
mistake to disregard value diferences, even at minute lev-
els, that occur across borders. 
Local is not only a circumstance that is relevant to
understanding particular governmental actions. Local also
provides a framework for understanding common con-
cerns such as shared resources, regional circumstances,
and intergovernmental cooperation. And, in the context of
disruption, local can play a signifcant role in at least the
following four categories: responsiveness, baseline informa-
tion generation, innovation research, and normalization. 
A.  Local Is Responsive to Change 
Environmental disruption is coming and, in fact, is here.
Law will have to develop new strategies to face the new
challenges and immediacy will be a factor. Government
strategies should be designed to launch on short notice. It is
easier to experiment with new regulations and approaches
at the local level: frst, because the closeness of local gov-
ernment to governed communities demands it; and sec-
ond, because the scale of local governance makes debate,
passage, and implementation of new approaches easier. 
Local governments are acutely responsive to social, eco-
nomic, and environmental change for good reason. Regard-
less of how such disruptions are perceived on a regional,
state, or federal level, they are felt locally. Te invention
of the elevator and automobile fundamentally altered the
role and potential of urban areas to provide homes and
economic opportunities. In turn, such disruptions helped
shape attention to infrastructure and governmental service
needs. More recently, local governments have expeditiously
responded to water shortages by prohibiting water waste,
restricting specifc water uses, and requiring installation
of efcient water fxtures and grey water use in new con-
struction and building renovations. Similarly, local govern-
ments have controlled stormwater fows by implementing
measures for permeable pavements, green roofs, and rain-
water harvesting.102 
B.  Local as a Source of Baseline Information 
As a matter of course, local governments gather and assess
information on local vulnerabilities to disruptions. Local
governments keep a watchful eye on natural and built
infrastructure assets, the availability of natural resources,
housing stocks, access to food and energy, and population
102. See, e.g., Chatham, Mass., Protective Bylaws §4(B) (2016) (foodplain 
development and permeable driveways); Denver, Colo., Code of Ordi-
nances §§10-300 to 10-308 (2017) (green roofs); San Diego, Cal., Rain 
Harvesting Rebate Program (cash incentives for rain barrel installation). 
dynamics. Local governments often require permit appli-
cants to provide critical information on development eleva-
tions, habitat values, and slope stability. Likewise, local
planning and development review processes have resulted
in a wealth of information on groundwater budgets, can-
opy cover, and buildable lands. 
Other local governments require energy benchmarking
and audits for larger buildings and governmental opera-
tions.103 Te information is commonly used to inform a
variety of local government decisions such as land use plan-
ning and permitting, budget decisions and infrastructure
planning, event planning, intergovernmental cooperation,
and even the exercise of eminent domain. Te informa-
tion helps to identify future risks and costs, the potential
for public interest in particular problems, and the solutions
that might be relevant. 
Local governments are not better at gathering this
information due to sophistication or funding. Local gov-
ernments are better at it because of their access to a deep
pool of relevant information and their lens through which
the information is discerned. Te important point here is
to recognize the critical role of location to the way local
governance happens. Based on geological, ecological, eco-
nomic, and cultural circumstances, communities adapt to
the demands of living in a particular place because com-
munities must survive in their own place. Tis type of
experienced information is tattooed with the values that
particular resources have to their benefciaries and users
and refected in local resource decisions. 
C.  Local as a Laboratory for Innovative Responses 
Communities approach particular changes in their own
ways—some dig in to wait out changes, some take more
protectionist ideals and seek to maintain the status quo
through zoning, where others employ more forward-
thinking measures through long-range planning. It
should not be surprising that diferent communities often
understand changing circumstances in ways that appear
to contradict. But it is also not surprising that a particular
community’s reaction to new challenges follows more or
less the same basic premise: although local needs and cir-
cumstances will vary, human needs and quality of life are
the common driver. 
Accordingly, the third observation about the importance
of local is variation in innovation. Te development of tech-
nologies and approaches to construction, infrastructure,
economic development priorities, education, and housing
(and others) is designed to resolve the efects of disruption
and secure a community’s vision against the backdrop of
change. Importantly, variation in local responses to disrup-
103. See, e.g., Atlanta, Ga., Code of Ordinances §8-2002 (2016) (requir-
ing both energy benchmarking and auditing for certain public and private 
buildings); Denver, Colo., Code of Ordinances §4-53 (2016) (com-
mercial building benchmarking and reporting); Seattle, Wash., Munici-
pal Code §22.920.010 (2010) (requiring building benchmarks and report-
ing); Austin, Tex., Code of Ordinances §6-7-31 (2011) (commercial 
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tion generates signifcant information on what works and
the local circumstances that facilitate stories of success. 
Many local governments are experimenting with incen-
tives to promote green building techniques and even
requiring developments to implement the most sophisti-
cated building materials. While the federal government
pursues policies that support coal and concrete, local gov-
ernments are pushing forward with promoting technologi-
cally advanced forms of building. Lancaster, California,
requires that many new buildings meet net-zero standards
or be outftted with a solar energy system that can produce
two watts of power for every square foot of the home.104 
Georgetown, Texas, ofers multiple incentives, includ-
ing net metering and rebates, for residents to add renew-
able energy sources to their properties.105 Miami Beach,
Florida, a city already struggling with climate change, is
assessing building fees to combat the impacts of rising sea
levels through innovative projects such as environmental
restoration projects, monitoring, green infrastructure, and
stormwater quality improvements.106 
D.  Local as Normalization 
Elevating location in an analysis of environmental gover-
nance does not suggest any particular value as a normative
matter. Tere will be few response strategies that will be
efective in every community, and a “good” strategy may
be best guided by the notion that it is good if it would work
here. In the meantime, preemption is a good check on local
governance, and top-down approaches to land use regula-
tion may ofer meaningful constraints on the bad kind of
intergovernmental and intercommunity competition. 
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of location suggests that
we should not rush to preempt local initiative. In the mean-
time, although local should be recognized for uniqueness,
the contingencies in the arena of local regulation can serve
as a gauge for developing norms. Successful strategies can
be borrowed and adapted to diferent communities, which
in turn will generate additional confdence as response
strategies across the spectrum of ecological, geological, and
hydrological diference normalize in the common goals
that drive locational adaptation. 
VII.  You Cannot Disrupt What Was Never 
Ordered—Land Use Policy in the 
United States 
Tis section was authored by Blake Hudson, A.L. O’Quinn
Chair in Environmental Studies and Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Houston Law Center. 
Te theme of the 2018 ELC, “Environmental Law. Dis-
rupted,” efectively captures the way in which federal
environmental law has been seemingly turned on its head
104. Lancaster, Cal., Energy Code §15.28.020(c) (2017). 
105. Georgetown, Tex., Code of Ordinances §13.04.083(D)(2) (2012). 
106. Miami Beach, Fla., Code of Ordinances §133-6(a) (2016). 
under the current Administration. It truly feels like a dis-
ruption, as if nearly 50 years of environmental progress is
not just being halted, but is at risk of being reversed, even
on issues that in recent decades seemed settled—like hav-
ing safe air to breathe and safe water to drink. Of course,
we have seen this play out before, such as when President
Reagan was frst elected and began the rollback of federal
environmental protections. But partisanship is much more
acute today than it was even then,107 and the disruption
seems to have an air of permanence about it, or at least an
air of long-term persistence. 
In light of this disruption, many are calling for an
increased reliance on the next line of defense, state govern-
ments. It is an understandable position, given that some
states have demonstrated an interest in addressing environ-
mental problems more broadly, as well as the political will
and administrative capacity to do so. Yet for many more
states, particularly in regions of the country like the South-
east (where I am from), an understanding of the state’s role
in protecting citizens from environmental and associated
economic harm, and development of the political will and
institutional capacity to carry out such programs, feels quite
remote. In these locations, it is arguably not much further
developed than it was when the state of Ohio seemed con-
tent to let the Cuyahoga River burn in the 1960s. 
But what about the areas of law where there never was
a comprehensive, ordered legal approach already in place
to be disrupted—the legal fronts where states have yet
to comprehensively exercise their authority to protect the
environment, and where the federal government has little
to no regulatory safeguards in place? Such is the case with
land development that impacts natural resources, and the
dearth of policies in place to comprehensively and efec-
tively deal with the scope of the problem. In this space,
there really cannot be a disruption of the legal regime,
because there never was a meaningful evolution or progres-
sion toward comprehensive environmental safeguards to
begin with. 
Control over the paving of landed natural capital with
development in the United States remains an uber-decen-
tralized mishmash of policy approaches (at least in places
where there are any policies actually implemented). Land
use regulation is the “quintessential state and local power,”
as articulated by the Supreme Court.108 Tus, the 50 states
hold the keys to how land development proceeds, with little
input from the federal government (except in the limited
circumstances where an endangered species109 or a wetland
connected to navigable waters110 are present). Most states,
in turn, often leave decisions over land use development
to the 88,000 subnational governments that stretch across
the United States—that is, unless the states do not like the
107. Carroll Doherty, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Growing Partisan Divide 
Over Political Values, Pew Res. Center, Oct. 5, 2017, http://www.pe-
wresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/05/takeaways-on-americans-growing-
partisan-divide-over-political-values/. 
108. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738, 36 ELR 20116 (2006). 
109. ESA of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544. 
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way in which local governments are trying to control land
development to prevent environmental harm, in which
case they can preempt those eforts.111 
While the federal government refuses to enter the regu-
latory space, land development impacts many of the targets
of federal environmental regulation.112 Land development
afects water quality (the CWA), air quality (mobile emis-
sions under the CAA), and the primary driver of species
decline, habitat destruction (the ESA). So the subject mat-
ter of federal environmental law could be addressed more
efectively if state and local governments engaged in better
land use planning. 
Considering the lack of federal involvement, and an ad
hoc, inconsistent approach to land use planning at the state
and local levels (with southeastern states being exception-
ally lax regarding land development controls),113 urban
sprawl proceeds apace, and natural capital is being replaced
at a profound rate. While some jurisdictions have engaged
in innovative land use planning and development, and
gains have been made on some fronts, until society begins
to view development per se as a complex, “super-wicked”
environmental problem, we will not maintain a sense of
urgency along policy fronts to address the problem’s scope.
We will keep addressing the symptoms of the land develop-
ment problem (endangered species, poor water quality, and
poor air quality) rather than fnding a cure for the disease. 
While explication of the minutiae is beyond my scope
here, I am currently working on a project developing a
typology of factors that contribute to the wickedness of the
land development problem (stay tuned). Tese include the
challenges of collective action unique to the land devel-
opment sector; corporate design of that sector; legal insti-
tutional hurdles; economic drivers; intersecting federal
policies; property rights; political economy; time/behav-
ioral science/spatial and geographic factors; population/ 
demographics; and an ever-changing natural environment
in a time of climate change. Articulating and exploring
these factors will be important, both to change the dia-
logue on land development as an environmental problem
and to more adequately inform policy responses to address
the problem. 
In short, the current state of afairs at the national level
is a dramatic disruption of environmental progress. But
we cannot forget the areas where holistic environmental
progress has never been achieved. In a world of growing
populations and economic growth tied quite directly114 to
the replacement of natural capital with human-built capi-
111. See Tom Dart, Denton, Texas, Banned Fracking Last Year—Ten the Frack-
ers Fought Back, Guardian, May 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2015/may/22/denton-texas-banned-fracking-; Andrew Fol-
lett, Louisiana Supreme Court Smacks Down Fracking Ban, Daily Caller,
June 20, 2016, https://dailycaller.com/2016/06/20/louisiana-supreme-
court-smacks-down-fracking-ban/. 
112. Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental 
Regulatory Reform, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1661 (2016). 
113. Blake Hudson, Te Natural Capital Crisis in Southern U.S. Cities, 92 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 529 (2017). 
114. J. Vernon Henderson et al., Measuring Economic Growth From Outer Space, 
102 Am. Econ. Rev. 992 (2012). 
tal (Texas, a state of 25 million people in 2010 is projected
to double to 50 million citizens by 2050115 due to rapid
economic expansion), we can no longer take our country’s
vast expanse of land for granted. We must do better to plan
and control growth, the development of our land, and the
replacement of our natural capital. If not, we will eventu-
ally fnd the loss of those environmental resources quite
disruptive to human progress and well-being. 
VIII.  Environmental Justice and 
Environmental Sustainability:  
Beyond Environment and Beyond Law 
Tis section was authored by Sarah Krakof, Associate Dean
for Faculty Afairs and Moses Lasky Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School; and Shannon Roesler, Professor
of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. 
Since the dawn of the environmental justice movement,
we have heard the stories of individuals and communities
left unprotected by our environmental laws and policies.
Teir stories reveal the deep-seated structures of racism
and inequality that determine what resources and which
people environmental law will protect. 
Despite risks to the cultural and natural resources of
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the federal government
allowed the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline.116 
When ofcials in Flint, Michigan, a majority-minority city
where 40% of the people live in poverty,117 purported to
cut costs by switching the city’s water supply, they cut cor-
ners and failed to treat the water to prevent corrosion. Teir
decisions exposed the city’s residents to dangerous levels
of lead in their drinking water.118 Recent hurricanes have
again devastated the most vulnerable communities, and
yet the president dismisses the 2,975 deaths from Hurri-
cane Maria in Puerto Rico as fake news created by Demo-
crats to make him “look as bad as possible.”119 
But thousands of people did die. Tousands of people
were exposed to lead in drinking water. And the promises
made to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, long ago enshrined
in treaties, were once again broken. How can the next gen-
eration of environmental laws do better? If the underly-
ing problems include structural racism and inequality, the
115. Alexa Ura, Report: Texas Population to Double by 2050, Tex. Tribute,
Mar. 5, 2015, https://www.texastribune.org/2015/03/05/report-texas-
population-double-2050/. 
116. See Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline 
Fight, NPR, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-
fght. 
117. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Flint City, Michigan, https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/fintcitymichigan/PST045217 (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018). 
118. See Anna Clark, “Nothing to Worry About. Te Water Is Fine”: How Flint 
Poisoned Its People, Guardian, July 3, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
news/2018/jul/03/nothing-to-worry-about-the-water-is-fne-how-fint-
michigan-poisoned-its-people. 
119. See Linda Qiu, Trump’s False Claims Rejecting Puerto Rico’s Death Toll 
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answer may require radical change. To achieve environ-
mental justice on a sustainable planet, the next generation
of environmental law will have to change in two ways. It
will have to go beyond the environment and beyond law. 
Tat is a tall order. But if we are asking big questions,
there is no point in being coy or timid. Tere are two huge
problems facing the planet right now. One is that its stable
operating systems are at risk of going awry. Climate change,
species extinction rates, and other indicators lead scientists
to worry that we are at risk of breaching the earth’s safe
boundaries for environmental stability. 
Te second is that inequality between rich and poor has
increased dramatically over roughly the same period that
we have put the planet’s operating systems in jeopardy. To
make matters even more complicated, wealth inequality is
shot through with the structures of racism and colonial-
ism. So, if we are thinking big, we might as well think
beyond the parameters of our training and disciplines. We
should think about what sorts of cultural, economic, and
legal structures would result in a just, equitable, and sus-
tainable world for humans and nonhumans. And then we
should try to think and imagine a way from here to there. 
Time is of the essence. We need new visions of an equi-
table, sustainable future now. Climate change (which is
just one of the earth system boundaries at risk) could soon
result in a virtually unrecognizable and volatile planet. In a
recent article, Swedish scientist Will Stefen and co-authors
outlined a scenario that leads the earth to a situation where
positive feedback mechanisms push “the Earth System
toward a planetary threshold that, if crossed, could prevent
stabilization of the climate . . . and cause continued warm-
ing on a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway . . . even as human
emissions are reduced.”120 Tat pathway is not inevitable,
but if it is not averted through rapid and steep reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions, “Hothouse Earth is likely to
be uncontrollable and dangerous to many . . . and it poses
severe risks for health, economies, political stability (espe-
cially for the most climate vulnerable), and ultimately, the
habitability of the planet for humans.”121 
If the “Hothouse Earth” scenario comes to pass, it
will occur on a planet marked by dramatic and racialized
inequality. Economist Tomas Piketty has documented
the rise in inequality since industrialization, attributing
it to the fact that capital wealth has grown faster than
incomes. Te upshot is that the United States and other
western democracies have very little economic mobility,
and are more similar in this regard to monarchical or feu-
dal societies than functioning democracies. In the United
States, the long history of legal, political, and economic
marginalization of African Americans, Native Americans,
and other non-whites means that today’s inequality is also
marked by race. 
Further, recent research has shown that natural haz-
ards not only have disparate impacts on poor and minor-
ity communities, but that they too contribute to wealth
120. Stefen et al., supra note 3. 
121. Id. at 8256 (emphasis added). 
inequality: “Overall, . . . natural hazard damages are
contributing to wealth inequality. Additionally . . . 
while inequality is occurring along other lines, the most
notable inequity is along lines of race, education and
homeownership.”122 In other words, environmental harms
not only have disparate economic and racial impacts, they
also entrench racialized inequality. 
In the current cultural and political moment, the struc-
tural causes of environmental degradation, rising inequal-
ity, and racism are converging in troubling ways. Following
the election of President Obama, a study found that white
Americans were less likely to view climate change as a seri-
ous problem, suggesting a link between racial resentment
and climate change denial.123 Moreover, under the Trump
Administration, U.S. environmental policies have actively
excluded the most vulnerable communities. 
For example, shortly after President Trump assumed
ofce, the head of EPA’s Ofce of Environmental Justice
resigned in response to the Administration’s proposed
cuts to environmental justice programs.124 In addition,
the Administration’s new $1-$7/ton social cost of carbon
completely ignores the costs of global warming outside the
United States, an isolationist approach to a quintessentially
global problem.125 Te Trump Administration’s indifer-
ence to the risks of a warming planet places the nation’s,
and the world’s, most vulnerable populations at greatest
risk. It is hardly surprising that a journalist summarized
the most recent international report on climate change in
the following way: “Either way, the outlook is dire, espe-
cially for the poor.”126 
So, what would laws look like that could take us of of
the pathway to a deeply unequal “Hothouse Earth” and
toward a just, equitable, and sustainable planet? Tey
would look like anti-poverty laws, wealth redistribution
laws, public infrastructure laws, and health care laws.
Tey would also look like much stronger and more direc-
tive environmental laws with interlinked goals of just and
equitable decarbonization. And environmental laws would
engage at all scales of governance, making local issues of
educational segregation and housing inequality national
priorities. In short, they would be laws that simultaneously
ensure a just, equal, and free society, and that protect the
ecological foundations of the planet. 
122. Junia Howell & James R. Elliott, Damages Done: Te Longitudinal Impacts of 
Natural Hazards on Wealth Inequality in the United States, Soc. Probs., Aug. 
14, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ 
socpro/spy016/5074453. 
123. Salil D. Benegal, Te Spillover of Race and Racial Attitudes Into Public Opin-
ion About Climate Change, 27 Envtl. Pol. 733 (2018), available at https:// 
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2018.1457287. 
124. See Timothy Cama, EPA’s Environmental Justice Head Resigns, Hill,
Mar. 9, 2017, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/323209-epas-
environmental-justice-head-resigns. 
125. See Brad Plumer, Trump Put a Low Cost on Carbon Emissions. Here’s Why It 
Matters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/ 
climate/social-cost-carbon.html. 
126. John H. Cushman Jr., 1.5 Degrees Warming and the Search for Climate Justice 
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To achieve such laws (and the economic system in which
they would participate) will likely take the kind of massive
and diverse activism that resulted in the civil rights and
environmental law making movements of the 1960s and
early 1970s. It will take a movement that seeks more than
legal change. Yet there is plenty for lawyers to do. Without
lawyers to do the work on the front end, and to be standing
by during and after the chaos, the chances of getting on the
right path are greatly diminished. In short, to get on the
path to a just, equitable, and sustainable earth, it will take
much more than legal change, but it will require no less
than the full attention of lawyers committed to defeating
racism, reversing inequality, and saving the planet. 
IX.  Malignant Normality 
Tis section was authored by Katrina Fischer Kuh, Haub Dis-
tinguished Professor of Environmental Law, Elisabeth Haub
School of Law at Pace University. 
In the spring of 2018, I joined professionals from a number
of areas, including law, public health, science, and psychol-
ogy, at the Witnessing Professionals and Climate Change
Conference at Princeton University, to contemplate the
impact that the global climate crisis has had on our under-
standing of professional responsibility. In the rich dis-
cussion that ensued, Prof. Robert Jay Lifton, lecturer in
psychiatry at Columbia University and distinguished pro-
fessor emeritus of psychiatry and psychology at the City
University of New York, used a phrase—“malignant nor-
mality”—that was referenced throughout the conversation
and has resonated with me as I have continued to consider
the intersection between climate change and the profes-
sional responsibilities of attorneys. 
In many important respects, norms of legal professional
conduct—as expressed in the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS) Statement of Good Practices by Law Profes-
sors in the Discharge of Teir Ethical and Professional Respon-
sibilities and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and
exemplifed by the actions of many attorneys and profes-
sional associations—position the legal profession to provide
support and leadership in response to climate change. Te
AALS Statement of Good Practices provides that law pro-
fessors have an “enhanced obligation to pursue individual
and social justice,” and that “engaging in law reform activi-
ties or advocating for improvements in law and the legal
system is a valued role of legal academics.”127 Te Model
Rules encourage attorneys to participate “in activities for
improving the law,”128 and allow attorneys when advising
clients to “refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors that
may be relevant to the client’s situation.”129 And the Envi-
ronmental Law Institute recently cosponsored the Second
National Conference of Lawyers Committed to Address-
127. AALS, Handbook: Statement of Good Practices 119 (2018). 
128. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct R. 6.1 (2016). 
129. Id. R. 2.1. 
ing the Climate Emergency, which involved participants
from across the professional spectrum, including private
practice, academia, and public interest. 
In other ways, however, legal professional norms may
frustrate an efcacious response by the profession to cli-
mate change. For example, little attention has been paid
to the role attorneys may have played in the energy indus-
try efort to mislead the public about climate science and
whether, if at all, the Model Rules speak to that type of
conduct. Naomi Oreskes and Geofrey Supran, Inside-
Climate News, and the Union of Concerned Scientists
have extensively documented how some energy industry
actors orchestrated a campaign to market lies about cli-
mate science to the public. While the role of attorneys in
the climate disinformation campaign is not (yet) clear,
attorneys were deeply involved in the similar campaign
by tobacco companies to lie to the public about the
health efects of smoking.130 Indeed, climate disinforma-
tion is but one in a series of revelations about corporate
public disinformation eforts that now perhaps includes
the safety of opioids as well. 
Yet, while many have recognized that attorneys often
advise clients regarding public relations, the Model Rules
provide little clear guidance about the norms that should
govern attorney conduct in this capacity: 
• Model Rule 3.3 (Advocate, Candor Toward the Tri-
bunal) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a
false statement of fact or law or ofering evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false, but is limited to repre-
sentations to a tribunal.131 
• Model Rule 3.6 (Advocate, Trial Publicity) prohibits
“[a] lawyer who is participating or has participated in
the investigation or litigation of a matter” from mak-
ing an “extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know will be disseminated by
means of public communication and will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adju-
dicative proceeding in the matter,” but is limited to
lawyers acting directly as spokespeople in the context
of an adjudicatory proceeding.132 
• Model Rule 4.1 (Transactions With Persons Other
Tan Clients—Truthfulness in Statements to Oth-
ers) prohibits lawyers from knowingly making a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person
and from failing to disclose a material fact to a third
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting
a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.133 But various 
requirements embedded in the rule raise uncertainty
as to whether and how it could apply to counseling
misleading public communications. It may be dif-
130. Bruce A. Green, Toughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the Ciga-
rette Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?, 51 
DePaul L. Rev. 407, 414-18 (2001). 
131. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2016). 
132. Id. R. 3.6. 
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cult to show that the underlying corporate conduct
constitutes fraud, as this is indexed to the substan-
tive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction
and information protected by privilege need not be
disclosed. Additionally, it is not clear what level of
knowledge satisfes the requirement for “knowingly,”
nor is it clear what would be understood to constitute
a material fact in that context. 
• Model Rule 8.4 (Maintaining the Integrity of the 
Profession, Misconduct) provides that it is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion, or to counsel a client to engage in activity that 
would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.134 
Tis would seem, on its face, to be potentially appli-
cable to attorney involvement in corporate disinfor-
mation campaigns. However, Model Rule 8.4 has 
not been interpreted or applied in a context similar 
to that of counseling corporate public disinforma-
tion. Te Restatement (Tird) of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers cautions courts to “avoid[ ] overbroad 
readings”135 of the model rule, and a review of cases 
and disciplinary proceedings reveals that the rule has 
typically been applied to conduct of a very diferent 
nature, such as when an attorney helps a client struc-
ture a fraudulent transfer to avoid a known creditor 
or backdates documents. 
Can attorneys ethically assist their clients in mislead-
ing the public through corporate disinformation cam-
paigns designed to distort public opinion, like the climate 
disinformation campaign? Te answer to that question is 
frustratingly opaque—there is no clear guidance under 
the Model Rules. In two companion articles, profes-
sional responsibility scholar Michele DeStefano Beardslee
reported on the results of a study documenting the increas-
ing role of attorneys in managing corporate public rela-
tions, and analyzed the Model Rules for guidance regarding 
attorneys functioning in that role.136 She concluded that 
“the current ethics rules, adversarial system, and economic 
incentives almost predestine that attorneys will aid their 
clients in misleading the public about corporate legal con-
troversies,” observing that “[f]or statements that misrepre-
sent or stretch the truth, the current interpretations of the 
Model Rules do little to constrain” attorney advocacy in the 
court of public opinion.137 
Te lack of clear guidance about the ethical obliga-
tions of attorneys advising clients in the public relations
context may thus be an aspect of our existing professional,
normative structure that has contributed to inertia on cli-
134. Id. R. 8.4. 
135. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §5 cmt. c (2000). 
136. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, In-
stallment One: Broadening the Rule of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 1259 (2009); Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court
of Public Opinion, Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys
Go?, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1119 (2010) [hereinafter Beardslee, Install-
ment Two]. 
137. Beardslee, Installment Two, supra note 136, at 1127, 1145. 
mate issues. And there are other climate-relevant aspects of
legal professional norms that warrant examination. Chief
among these is the continued greenhouse gas-intensive
travel to professional conferences that is, perhaps, profigate
in present circumstances. Critical assessment of these and
other legal professional norms is warranted to ensure that
embedded professional norms, practices, and structures do
not inadvertently contribute to a malignant normality that
deepens the climate crisis. 
X.  Disruption as Opportunity 
Tis section was authored by Jessica Owley, Professor, Univer-
sity at Bufalo School of Law. 
Te world has always been full of disturbances, alterations,
and disruptions. Tis has been particularly true when exam-
ining the ecological conditions of the earth. Our planet has
undergone many changes, even some drastic ones. Yet the
current rate of environmental disruption is unquestionable
and unprecedented. Humans are a particularly destructive
species. We convert species habitat. We pollute rivers. We
overhunt. Our current historical environmental atrocities,
however, seem trivial in the context of climate change. We
are changing our atmosphere, our ocean currents, and our
ecosystems. Particularly tricky is the unpredictability of
climate change impacts and intensities. 
A.  Legal Disruption 
Complicating the environmental disruption is an increased
disruption of the American legal system. In the 1970s, the
federal government began acknowledging environmental
harms in our country and created legal strategies to com-
bat them. Te goal of the CAA (1970) is to prevent and
control air pollution. Te CWA (1972) seeks to eliminate
the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters. Te
ESA (1973) recognizes the negative impacts of humans on
the environment and seeks a “means whereby the ecosys-
tems upon which endangered species . . . depends may be
conserved.”138 And with the clearest acknowledgement of
human impacts on the environment, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970) recognizes “the pro-
found impact of man’s activities”139 on the natural world,
and sets a national policy to “prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of [hu]man[s].”140 
While the efectiveness of these laws and the strategies
Congress adopted is open for debate, the laws represent an
awareness of environmental harm and a need to combat
it. All of these statutes and others are now under attack
from the Trump Administration and the Republican Con-
gress.141 Te Administration is seeking repeal and revi-
138. 16 U.S.C. §1531(b). 
139. 42 U.S.C. §4331(a), ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209. 
140. Id. §4321. 
141. See Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump Is 
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sion of the statutes along with changes to regulations and
agency policies. Beyond the laws on the books, the Admin-
istration is also disrupting federal environmental law by
dismantling the agencies that carry out those laws.142 Te
number of employees is shrinking along with departmental
budgets.143 Science posts are being removed or left unflled
and scientifc reports and language specifcally prohibited
or hidden.144 
While the assault on the panoply of existing federal
environmental programs is disheartening, federal climate
change policy is truly depressing. In 1992, world leaders
(along with many others) met in Brazil and acknowledged
the intense environmental, economic, and social problems
caused by global climate change.145 Agreeing that the cause
was “anthropogenic,” President George H.W. Bush signed
the agreement and applauded the countries of the world
in taking quick action to combat the serious problem of
climate change.146 
Despite this statement (and the U.S. role in shaping
both the initial agreement and subsequent accords), the
federal government has never been a true leader in the fght
against climate change. However, the Trump Administra-
tion’s actions in this realm are so radical as to again merit
the label disruptive. Shortly after taking ofce, President
Trump announced withdrawal of the United States from
the Paris Agreement.147 Even more insulting, the only sig-
nifcant U.S. delegation at the last Conference of Parties to
that 1992 treaty preached increased use of fossil fuels.148 As 
Mar. 31, 2017, but continually updated, https://news.nationalgeographic. 
com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment/; Nadja Popo-
vich et al., 76 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. 
Times, originally published Oct. 5, 2017, but periodically updated, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-
rules-reversed.html. 
142. See, e.g., Brady Dennis et al., With a Shrinking EPA, Trump Delivers on 
His Promise to Cut Government, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 2018, https://wapo. 
st/2CAA1vB?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.be924cb30f7b. 
143. See, e.g., Paul Bedard, Success: EPA Set to Reduce Staf 50% in Trump’s First 
Term, Wash. Examiner, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer. 
com/success-epa-set-to-reduce-staf-50-in-trumps-frst-term; Jenny Row-
land, National Parks Are the Real Losers in Trump’s Budget and Infrastruc-
ture Proposals, ThinkProgress, Feb. 13, 2018 (describing cuts to staf 
and funding for the National Park Service), https://thinkprogress.org/ 
national-parks-trump-infrastructure-budget-f0530e5fa7c4/. 
144. Coral Davenport, How Much Has “Climate Change” Been Scrubbed From 
Federal Websites? A Lot., N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/01/10/climate/climate-change-trump.html; Jef Tollefson, 
News Feature, Science Under Siege: Behind the Scenes at Trump’s Troubled 
Environment Agency, 559 Nature 316 (2018); Megan Jula & Rebecca 
Leber, 2017 Was a Big Year for Scrubbing Science From Government Websites. 
Here’s the List., Mother Jones, Dec. 29, 2017, https://www.motherjones.
com/environment/2017/12/2017-was-a-big-year-for-scrubbing-science-
from-government-websites-heres-the-list/. 
145. United Nations, Earth Summit, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html 
(last revised May 23, 1997). 
146. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for sig-
nature June 4, 1992, art. I, ¶ 5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; 
President George Bush, Te President’s News Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
(June 13, 1992), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266798. 
147. Timmons Roberts, One Year Since Trump’s Withdrawal From the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement, Brookings, June 1, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from-
the-paris-climate-agreement/. 
148. Irene Baños Ruiz, COP23: U.S. Promotes Coal at Bonn Climate Confer-
ence, DW, Nov. 13, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/cop23-us-promotes-
with the disruption to our environment, the disruption to
our environmental laws is unprecedented. 
B.  Disruption as an Opportunity 
Te real conundrum for environmental activists and
humans who care about the world is determining what
to do in the face of this disruption. Te paragraphs
above paint a bleak picture and suggest that disruption
is doing signifcant harm. A challenge then is whether
we can turn that attitude on its head and make these
disruptions opportunities. 
At our 2018 ELC meeting, Vanessa Casado Pérez noted
that crisis, hitting rock bottom, is what really spurs human
action on environmental issues. If things are really falling
apart at the federal government, maybe this disruption
of environmental law will trigger new energy and action
from other sectors. Disruptions in innovation are changes
to technologies that can help sectors (and sometimes even
societies) leap ahead to a new level. Creative ideas lead to
new solutions. 
One sphere where this environmental and legal disrup-
tion is inspiring action is in the private sector. While the
business sector can be a force for positive change, there is
also a strength in individuals acting on their own or join-
ing forces with the power of nongovernmental organiza-
tions. In this light, a turn to the private seems both logical
and sensible. Citizens seek to fll in the gaps left by a with-
drawn federal government. It is unclear whether they can
work as efectively toward reducing the harms of ecological
disruption, but in a time of legal disruption, their eforts
gain prominence. Tree examples highlight this trend: 
• Citizen science and information protection. As gov-
ernment agencies began scrubbing their websites of
environmental information, particularly discussions
of climate change, others began archiving the infor-
mation and making it available. Private organiza-
tions like the Environmental Data and Governance
Initiative formed shortly after information began dis-
appearing from public websites.149 Groups that had
formed earlier for other reasons (like associations of
librarians)150 also took up the cause of protecting and
providing information when they saw the need arise.
Additionally, while EPA may be employing fewer sci-
entists, people across the planet are stepping up and
collecting data to aid in scientifc research and envi-
ronmental monitoring. Te rise of the citizen scien-
tist is an innovation that can improve environmental
information and outcomes if deployed correctly.151 
coal-at-bonn-climate-conference/a-41368248. 
149. Environmental Data and Governance Initiative, About, https://envirodata-
gov.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
150. See Jef McMahon, Where to Find Tose EPA Web Pages Scrubbed by the 
Trump Administration, Forbes, May 2, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jefmcmahon/2017/05/02/where-to-fnd-epa-web-pages-scrubbed-by-
the-trump-administration/#58c691d3bba3. 
151. See Special Issue: Te Role of Citizen Science in Biological Conservation, 208 
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• Increasing support of environmental nongovernmental 
organizations and land trusts. After the election of
President Trump, donations to environmental advo-
cacy organizations rose. Public attention to environ-
mental issues can be seen in events like the March for
Science and the Peoples Climate Movement. Gallup’s
most recent polls show concern for the environment
growing in the United States, even as fewer people
identify themselves as environmentalists.152 
Land trusts are an interesting part of this trend.
Like other environmental organizations, they also
saw their membership numbers and dollars increase
post-Trump. Teir focus difers from traditional
environmental advocacy organizations as they seek
to meet their conservation goals through protec-
tion of individual parcels and working with property
tools. By purchasing land and rights in land, they
seek to prevent development and conversion of land
to uses that diminish ecosystem services and ame-
nities. Working with private landowners, they often
bring new people into the conservation movement.
Trough working with property rights, they create
restrictions that are more durable than federal regula-
tory mechanisms. 
• Citizen suits. Finally, despite a hollowing-out of our
environmental laws, activists are drawing upon the
citizen suit provisions contained in many of our key
environmental statutes. While there have been some
proposals that would impact some of the fee-shifting
provisions of citizen suits, neither Congress nor the
executive branch has suggested repealing citizen suit
provisions or revising the Administrative Procedure
Act, which often provides the hook for environmen-
tal litigation. Law frms are preparing for an increase
in environmental citizen suits and the environmen-
tal activists seem happy to comply. Tus, we can still
look to our 1970s law for some solace, even though
we must acknowledge that the standing hurdles for
environmental citizen suits are nontrivial. 
Tese examples illustrate how energy and innovation by
private actors can be part of the story of response to the
current disruption of environmental law. Taken together
with other examples and proposals in these essays, they can
provide us with a way forward, if not quite a way out. 
XI.  Designing Law to Prevent Runaway 
Climate Change 
Tis section was authored by Melissa Powers, Jefrey Bain
Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, and Director, Green
Energy Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School. 
152. Gallup, Environment, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018); Frank Newport, New Series: Where Americans 
Stand on the Environment, Energy, Gallup Blog, Mar. 22, 2018, https:// 
news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/231386/new-series-americans-stand-
environment-energy.aspx. 
“Every system is perfectly designed to get the results it
gets.”153 If that is so, our climate and energy laws have been
perfectly designed to fall short. Tey will not avoid the cat-
astrophic consequences of climate change or enable a swift
transition to a zero-carbon energy system,154 because they
have not been designed to achieve those outcomes. Instead,
climate and energy laws in the United States, including
those promoted by the most progressive jurisdictions, are
designed to gradually reduce some emissions and eventu-
ally phase out fossil fuels from some sectors,155 but they are
not designed to achieve the drastic systemic changes in our
energy sectors and human behavior that are necessary to
quickly and permanently reduce greenhouse gases. Even
laws that may appear to have ambitious fnal targets—such
as an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions or 100%
renewable power by 2050—are designed with loopholes
and exemptions that make it unlikely that the targets will
be met.156 
For the United States and the world to have a chance of
preventing runaway climate change, we need to change our
approach to law making. Rather than focus on incremental
changes that we hope will meet future targets, we must cre-
ate outcome-oriented climate and energy laws that ensure
compliance.157 Otherwise, our slim chance to prevent run-
away climate change will be lost. 
U.S. environmental law is entering its ffth decade, and
while the existing legal system has produced signifcant
improvements in air and water quality, it is not up to the
task of addressing climate change.158 Tis is because U.S.
environmental law is not end-goal-oriented, and the few
laws that may seem to establish ambitious goals are not
designed to meet them. Consider the CWA, which estab-
lishes the goal of restoring and maintaining “the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” so
that every U.S. water body is fshable and swimmable.159 
However ambitious that goal may seem, the permitting
systems under the CWA are designed and/or applied to
allow continued degradation of water bodies, including
153. Tis observation is attributed to Dr. Paul B. Batalden. Susan Carr, 
A Quotation With a Life of Its Own, Patient Safety & Qual-
ity Healthcare, July 1, 2008, https://www.psqh.com/analysis/editor-s-
notebook-a-quotation-with-a-life-of-its-own/. 
154. IPCC, supra note 47. 
155. Few Countries Are Pricing Carbon High Enough to Meet Climate Targets,
OECD, Sept. 18, 2018, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/few-coun-
tries-are-pricing-carbon-high-enough-to-meet-climate-targets.htm; Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Effec-
tive Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions Through Taxes 
and Emissions Trading (2018). 
156. See Carbon Tax or Cap-and-Trade?, David Suzuki Found., Oct. 5, 2017 
(noting the uncertain emission reductions under carbon taxes and the op-
portunity for loopholes to be engineered into the complex regulations of 
cap-and-trade programs as well as carbon taxes), https://davidsuzuki.org/ 
what-you-can-do/carbon-tax-cap-trade. 
157. Accord Isabella Lövin, To Lead on Climate, Countries Must Commit to 
Zero Emissions, Guardian, Apr. 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2018/apr/17/to-lead-on-climate-countries-must-commit-to-
zero-emissions. 
158. Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental 
Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 Envtl. L. 1, 6-23 (2017) (dis-
cussing the history, achievements, and shortcomings of current U.S. envi-
ronmental law). 
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those that are neither swimmable nor fshable due to his-
torical and ongoing pollution and habitat destruction. 
Te CAA’s goal of “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the 
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of 
its population,”160 is similarly too vague to be considered 
outcome-oriented. In addition, implementation of the 
CAA focuses on balancing the economic interests of pol-
luters with the public’s interest in pollution reduction.161 At 
best, this balance will produce deep emissions reductions 
where cost-beneft analyses support them, but the balance 
is subject to distortion—as the Trump Administration’s 
ongoing eforts to dismantle Obama-era environmental 
regulations reveal. 
Even the Acid Rain Program under the CAA, which
sets a fnal aggregate cap on sulfur dioxide emissions, uses
a fnal target that was set based on politics, not environ-
mental needs.162 U.S. environmental law seeks to slow the
pace of degradation or to gradually accelerate the rate of
improvement. While it is important that these laws are
applied to greenhouse gases until we have better laws in
place, it is also essential to recognize that existing environ-
mental law will not, in and of itself, do the job of prevent-
ing runaway climate change. 
Nor will state and local eforts, as currently designed,
do the job. In response to the Trump Administration’s
announcement that it will withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, and in response to the Trump Administration’s
assault on dozens of U.S. environmental rules,163 states
and local governments have declared their intent to take a
leading role in mitigating climate change.164 Teir actions,
while both commendable and necessary, are generally not
designed to achieve decarbonization as an end goal. 
Leading states like California and New York have
enacted scores of laws to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,165 
but neither state has committed to energy decarbonization.
California recently adopted a target of obtaining 100%
zero-carbon electricity by 2045,166 but the state does not
160. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q. 
161. See, e.g., Michigan v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 
(2015) (holding that EPA must consider costs borne by power plants when 
deciding whether to regulate power plants under the CAA). 
162. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Re-
search, Working Paper No. 2012-012, The SO2 Allowance Trading 
System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment (2012), 
available at http://ceepr.mit.edu/fles/papers/2012-012.pdf. 
163. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 Daily 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 373 (June 1, 2017); Harvard Environmental Law Pro-
gram, Regulatory Rollback Tracker, http://environment.law.harvard.edu/ 
policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
164. Sarah Holder, One Year After Trump Left the Paris Agreement, Who’s Still In?, 
CityLab, June 1, 2018, https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/06/ 
one-year-after-trump-left-the-paris-agreement-whos-still-in/561674/. 
165. See, e.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 
ch. 488; Act of Sept. 16, 2009, 2009 N.Y. Laws ch. 433 (establishing a state 
energy planning board to address, in part, greenhouse gas emissions). 
166. 100% Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, ch. 312, 2017/2018 Cong. 
(Cal. 2018); David Roberts, California Just Adopted Its Boldest Energy 
Target Yet: 100% Clean Electricity, Vox, Sept. 10, 2018, https://www.
vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/31/17799094/california-100-
percent-clean-energy-target-brown-de-leon. 
have a goal or a strategy for eliminating fossil fuels from
its transportation or heating sectors. Several local govern-
ments, happily, have made commitments to decarbonize
all aspects of their energy systems.167 But, thus far, they do
not have strategies to meet their commitments. In short, we
lack both goals and designs for efective decarbonization. 
We must change this approach. Te United States and
the rest of the world must quickly establish and achieve
end goals for climate mitigation. Climate scientists have
already told us what these end goals must be: for the world
to have a chance of keeping temperature increases to toler-
able levels, we must decarbonize our energy systems and,
ultimately, achieve net-negative emissions targets through
carbon sequestration.168 Global greenhouse gas emissions
must stop increasing, immediately, and they must then
rapidly drop, so that, by 2050, developed countries emit
no greenhouse gases from fossil fuels. 
U.S. lawmakers at the local, state, and federal (after the
Trump Administration is out of ofce) levels must commit
to complete energy decarbonization by 2050.169 Tey then
must design their decarbonization strategies to ensure they
meet this ambitious target. Much like we expect architects
to design buildings that will perform as expected, we need
to expect our lawmakers and regulatory agencies to cre-
ate decarbonization strategies that will achieve the goals.
Rather than apply existing laws with the hope that they
will eventually reduce emissions over time, we need to cre-
ate legal systems that ensure success. If “every system is
perfectly designed to get the results it gets,” it is past time
for the United States to adopt a design approach to decar-
bonization. We cannot aford to get it wrong. 
XII.  Preparing Environmental Law for the 
Climate Dystopia 
Tis section was authored by J.B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen
Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Program on Law and
Innovation, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and
Land Use Program, Vanderbilt Law School. 
Te probability of holding the climb in atmospheric tem-
perature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, the central
goal of the Paris Agreement,170 is rapidly approaching
zero.171 Barring a global political miracle, technological
breakthrough, or economic collapse, we will surpass 2°C
167. Sierra Club, 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties & States, https://www. 
sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
168. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C: Headline Statements (2018), 
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_headline_statements.pdf. 
169. See Nancy Bazilchuk, It’s Important to Have a Goal: UN Climate Re-
port View From the Nordics, ScienceNordic, Oct. 15, 2018 (discuss-
ing the importance of ambitious targets), http://sciencenordic.com/ 
its-important-have-goal-un-climate-report-view-nordics. 
170. See Yun Gao et al., Te 2°C Global Temperature Target and the Evolution of 
the Long-Term Goal of Addressing Climate Change—From the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement, 3 Engi-
neering 272, 272 (2017). 
171. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, Here’s How Far the World Is From Meet-
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and enter an era of climate dystopia.172 How long that
lasts before, if ever, we turn the corner is anyone’s guess.
Among the many casualties will be environmental law as
we know it. 
I paint a bleak picture, but it is one our nation’s insti-
tutions of environmental law must face. Vast expanses of
human populations will demand their well-being be pro-
tected from storms, droughts, pests, diseases, and other
intense harms that extreme climate change will bring their
way. Te built environment will be reinforced or moved.
Agricultural lands will be retooled or relocated. Halting
the spread of crop pests will be a priority. Malaria, den-
gue fever, and other diseases will be controlled at all costs.
Water will be moved to where it desperately is needed. Peo-
ple living where relief is simply unattainable will be relo-
cated or leave of their own accord. 
Equitable distribution of these and other protective
measures will be demanded. And if environmental pro-
grams such as NEPA, the ESA, §404 of the CWA, the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
and their many kin stand in the way of these adaptive
responses, they will be mowed down. To be blunt about it:
environmental law must prepare for the climate dystopia or
be pushed aside. 
Te prospect of a climate dystopia means environmen-
tal law must put its money where its mouth is. For more
than a decade, advocates for swift and robust controls on
greenhouse gas emissions argued—rightly so—that failure
to implement such controls would lead to a drastic global
scenario of massive disruption to social-ecological systems.
With failure increasingly likely, it would be untenable to
suggest that the scenario is less dire than claimed or that
adaptation measures of unprecedented scale and magni-
tude will not be necessary. Rather, climate change “miti-
gationists” must now work alongside “adaptationists,” and
environmental law will need to conform to both agendas. 
To be clear, I am not for a moment suggesting that envi-
ronmental law back of eforts to control greenhouse gas
emissions—even as we pass 2°C, we must continue work to
turn it around (although a separate issue is whether hard-
line environmentalism’s opposition to new gas pipelines
and electric transmission lines is actually impeding mitiga-
tion173). Rather, it is climate change adaptation, not mitiga-
tion, that will push back on environmental law as we know
it. Yet, as much as environmental law must pursue “deep
decarbonization,” it also must facilitate “deep adaptation.” 
Tis will be a new kind of challenge for environmental
law. For the most part, the controversies enveloping envi-
ronmental law until now have mostly been about an “envi-
ronment versus economy” rhetoric.174 Environmental law
172. See generally IPCC, supra note 46. 
173. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Pipeline Opposition Impedes Climate Change Mitiga-
tion, Reg. Rev., Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/13/ 
pipeline-opposition-impedes-climate-change-mitigation/. 
174. Ian Carey, Te Great Economy Versus Environment Myth, Huffpost, June 
5, 2012, https://www.hufngtonpost.com/ian-carey/the-great-economy-
versus-_b_1398439.html. 
has long been cast by critics as the enemy of jobs175 and
the enemy of property rights,176 but rarely has it been con-
demned, even by its most ardent opponents, as the enemy
of public health and safety (a recent example, though, is
President Trump’s preposterous claim that water conser-
vation initiatives had prevented frefghters from accessing
water to combat California’s raging wildfres177). Tat will
change in the era of climate change adaptation, if environ-
mental law does not itself adapt. 
Before considering what can be done to prepare envi-
ronmental law for the climate dystopia, let us consider and
dispense with the option of staying the course, fghting the
fght, and not giving an inch. Tis strikes me as a suicidal
strategy. People whose health, safety, and security depend
on rapid and robust adaptation measures—shoring up
coastal barriers, eradicating disease-bearing insects, con-
trolling foods, protecting crops from new migrating pests,
and securing drinking water supplies—will have sharply
diminished tolerance for protracted NEPA litigation, for
avoiding all impacts to endangered species, for staying out
of wetlands, for conserving water supplies, and for other
environmental protection and conservation measures
taken as a given today. 
Giving no ground by behaving as if the climate adapta-
tion demand for new infrastructure is like today’s highway
project, or as if the demand for deploying new pesticides is
like today’s FIFRA registration challenge, or as if the need
to clear habitat for new agricultural land development or
new infrastructure is like today’s endangered species con-
fict, will be a sorely misguided strategy. Tis is not to say
environmental law must simply go away, but taking a hard-
line position of enforcing all existing environmental laws
to the hilt will ignite a furious backlash that could open the
door to a wholesale rollback of regulatory programs, and
with broad and deep public support for doing so. 
So the more realistic question to ask is, what can envi-
ronmental law do now to become more facilitative of cli-
mate change adaptation without sacrifcing core values
and goals? We do not want to throw the baby out with
the bathwater. Several strategies seem viable and capable
of being implemented under existing laws. Te following
descriptions of their core approaches use federal law as the
medium for explanation, but they could be instituted at
state and local levels as well. 
175. Tomas J. Pyle, Environmentalists’ Worst Enemy May Be Teir Own Poli-
cies, Forbes, Aug. 11, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/
08/11/environmentalists-worst-enemy-may-be-their-own-policies/#701
bbae3a61d. 
176. Roger Pilon, Property Rights and Environmental Protection, Cato Inst.,
June 27, 1995, https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/ 
property-rights-environmental-protection. 
177. John D. Sutter, Trump’s “Ridiculous” Tweet About California Wildfres,
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A.  Maximize Connections to Public Health 
and Safety 
Although some corners of environmental law are closely
tied to promoting public health, such as air pollution regu-
lations, that connection has not often been drawn to nat-
ural resources programs such as the ESA and §404, and
protecting public safety has generally not been a theme of
environmental law. More could be done on this front. Te
ecosystem services theme that has gained prominence in
the past two decades is aimed in this direction.178 
For example, wetlands provide water purifcation and
groundwater recharge services as well as protection against
inland fooding and coastal storm surges. Wherever it can
be shown that robust protection of natural resources pro-
motes climate change adaptation strategies, those connec-
tions should be made and widely advertised. Tis will only
go so far, however, as those connections must be shown to
be real and credibly assessed. 
B.  Establish Criteria for What Qualifes as a 
Climate Change Adaptation Action 
Clearly, not every action and project should be considered
as furthering climate change adaptation, hence it will be
important to establish a set of criteria for designating a proj-
ect as truly serving necessary and urgent climate change
adaptation and thus qualifying for the approaches outlined
below. A multiagency commission could be charged with
evaluating which projects qualify. Tis could very likely
be instituted by a presidential Executive Order establishing
the commission, outlining the goals, and directing execu-
tive agencies to use existing authorities to achieve them. 
C.  Embrace Compensatory Mitigation 
Although compensatory mitigation already is deeply 
embedded in many programs, most prominently in §404 
wetlands mitigation banking,179 it needs to be expanded, 
simplifed, and made widely available. Climate adapta-
tion, especially shoring up or relocating built environment 
infrastructure, is going to have extensive impacts on natu-
ral resources, and holding to the strategies of avoid and 
minimize preferred in today’s environmental programs 
will be problematic. 
Also, the Obama Administration’s stated goal of hav-
ing compensatory mitigation produce net environmental
benefts, even when not required by law (it seldom is),180 
178. Te Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, http:// 
www.teebweb.org/resources/ecosystem-services/ (last visited Nov. 26, 
2018). 
179. U.S. EPA, Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation Fact Sheet, https:// 
www.epa.gov/sites/production/fles/2015-08/documents/compensatory_ 
mitigation_factsheet.pdf. 
180. Presidential Memorandum: Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources From 
Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 
68743 (Nov. 6, 2015), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-ofce/2015/11/03/mitigating-impacts-natural-resources-develop-
ment-and-encouraging-related. 
which the Trump Administration rescinded,181 would be
a magnet for opposition. Something closer to the ESA’s
“maximum extent practicable” standard for qualifying
actions, which does not require full compensation (much
less net benefts) could be workable.182 Section 404 of the
CWA itself imposes no standard; indeed, it does not men-
tion mitigation183—Congress required the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to establish “performance
standards” for mitigation in a 2004 military appropriations
bill, but they also imposed no outcome standard.184 It may
also be necessary to allow compensatory mitigation after
the fact, so as to expedite necessary projects. 
D.  Expedite Processes 
Speaking of which, there already is a ferce debate over
whether predecision impact assessment processes such as
NEPA, ESA §7, and FIFRA registration take too long to
complete and are too costly. Tat debate will only intensify
as important adaptation measures are at stake. But manda-
tory page limits and time limits are not needed across the
board, as the Trump Administration is seeking.185 Rather,
qualifying climate adaptation projects could be moved to
an alternative consolidated impact assessment “fast track”
under which one document would serve all such review
programs, only “no action” and “proposed action” would be
considered as the alternatives, and mandatory time frames
would be in efect. Nothing in NEPA, §7 of the ESA, or
§404 of the CWA precludes such an approach for land
development projects. Te respective agencies (Council on
Environmental Quality, EPA, and the Corps) could there-
fore promulgate regulations establishing this approach. 
E.  Leverage Statutory Substantive Flexibility 
Many of our current environmental laws actually are
sufciently fexible to allow regulators to scale back on
controls and conditions where appropriate to facilitate
important climate adaptation initiatives. For example,
§404(b)(1) of the CWA, which authorizes EPA to promul-
gate water degradation guidelines for the Corps’ issuance
of §404 permits, does not establish any fxed standards
or limits.186 By cross-reference to §403(c),187 it simply lists 
the types of efects the guidelines must address. And EPA
is authorized in §404(c) to veto a Corps permit only if it
will result in an “unacceptable adverse efect” on any of
several specifed resources.188 
181. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017). 
182. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
183. 33 U.S.C. §1344. 
184. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
136, §314, 117 Stat. 1392, 1393 (2003). 
185. Fact Sheet, Te White House, President Donald J. Trump’s Administration 
Is Improving Inefcient Permitting Reviews (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefngs-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-adminis-
tration-improving-inefcient-permitting-reviews/. 
186. 33 U.S.C. §1344(b)(1). 
187. Id. §1343(c). 
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Similarly, FIFRA pesticide registration is held to a stan-
dard of not imposing “unreasonable adverse efects on the
environment,” defned to require a cost-beneft analysis.189 
EPA very likely would have the authority to carve out qual-
ifying climate change adaptation infrastructure projects
and pesticide registrations for a specialized set of guidelines
as to what are “unacceptable” and “unreasonable” envi-
ronmental impacts. Even the ESA, often depicted as rigid
and demanding, has room for fexing on behalf of climate
adaptation projects. For example, given that it operates on
a species-wide assessment scale, very few projects today
result in the dreaded “jeopardy” fnding under the inter-
agency consultation provision of §7,190 and the §10 permit-
ting process for nonfederal actions leaves ample room for
using compensatory mitigation fexibly.191 
F.  Institute “Repair Accounts” and “Repair  Planning”  
to Offset Relaxed Standards 
Te quid pro quo for all of the above could be to keep track
of impacts that were not avoided, minimized, or mitigated
because of the above measures, and put them in a “repair
account” tagged to the entities carrying out the project. A
condition of the permits covering the project could be to
develop a “repair plan” that would require fxing or com-
pensating for those impacts in the future when it makes
sense to do so. For example, repair eforts might not be
prudent while temperatures are past 2°C and still rising. 
G.  Conclusion 
Tese and similar measures within reach under exist-
ing environmental laws may not provide enough “fex”
to accommodate needed adaptation initiatives, in which
case the statutory can of worms might need to be opened
up. Tat prospect could be ugly for environmental law. It
behooves those interested in keeping environmental pro-
tection and conservation in play for adaptation policy,
therefore, to fnd creative ways of molding today’s environ-
mental programs to meet tomorrow’s climate adaptation
needs while maintaining as much of the core goals in place
as possible. 
I appreciate that this sounds like a call for compromise— 
because it is—and that environmentalists have long been
wary of compromises, likening them to sleeping with the
enemy. But when it comes to climate change adaptation,
refusing to compromise is a fool’s errand. Te challenge
will be in designing compromises that allow important cli-
mate change adaptation measures to go forward without
imposing unnecessary adverse environmental impacts and
without opening the door too wide to what qualifes for
more fexible treatment. Te sooner environmental insti-
tutions begin thinking about this challenge and crafting
approaches like those described above, the sooner they will
189. 7 U.S.C. §136(bb). 
190. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2). 
191. Id. §1539(a)(2). 
be perceived as a friend of adaptation asking only for rea-
sonable environmental safeguards. 
XIII.  Memo to Environmentalists:  
Brace for Problems of Preemption,  
Property Rights, and Political Scale 
Tis section was authored by Erin Ryan, Elizabeth C. &
Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law. 
It is a daunting moment for environmentalists. Each day,
it appears federal environmental law is being systematically
dismantled, most aggressively by the executive branch,192 
but with tacit support from the sitting legislature, and— 
with record numbers of President Trump’s judicial nomi-
nees sailing through the appointments process193—likely
soon with increasing support from the judiciary. Environ-
mental advocates are grieving these losses, but we must also
brace for new hurdles—and, in particular, the “Tree Ps”:
preemption, property rights, and political scale. 
First, we must ensure that the campaign to dismantle
federal environmental law does not spill over into displac-
ing state and local eforts to fll the void. Ten, we must
push back against the strategic deployment of property
rights to block future eforts to reinvigorate federal envi-
ronmental law. Finally, we must think creatively about how
to accomplish the goals of national-level environmental
policy without the beneft of federal authority. Tis essay, a
memo to environmentalists at this pivotal moment in time,
reviews each of these challenges in turn. 
A.  Preemption 
Preemption refers to the ability of a higher level of gov-
ernment to override contrary decisions made by a lower
level of government. It matters a lot in environmental
law, where important roles are played by federal, state,
and local decisionmakers. Federal environmental statutes
often partner national and local regulators in distinct but
interlocking roles within larger programs of cooperative
federalism—in which the feds usually set standards and
oversee compliance, while state and local actors decide
how best to implement standards for local circumstanc-
es.194 Tese laws usually follow the model of “foor pre-
emption,” establishing a federal “foor” of mandatory
regulation that states may not fall below, but one that
allows them to set more stringent regulations to address
local concerns and preferences.195 
192. Popovich et al., supra note 141. 
193. Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many Federal Ap-
peals Judges as Obama in His First Year, Time, Dec. 15, 2017, http://time. 
com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/. 
194. Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in The Law and 
Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis 355 
(Kalyani Robbins ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). 
195. See William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
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Federal environmental laws do not usually prevent
states from exceeding the federal foor, but there are excep-
tions—for example, automobile emissions standards. EPA
has primary authority to set these standards, and states
are generally forbidden from both raising and lowering
them.196 Even so, §209 of the CAA authorizes California to
set more stringent standards in light of its unique regional
challenges197—and under §177, other states may elect Cali-
fornia’s stricter standard in lieu of the EPA “ceiling.”198 Te
interplay between state and federal standard-setting under
the “California waiver”199 blunts the force of this example
of “ceiling preemption,”200 which is generally rare in U.S.
environmental law. But with mounting hostility to envi-
ronmental regulation, that could change. 
Which brings us to the frst challenge that environ-
mental advocates will likely face: the increasing threat of
anti-environmental federal preemption. Proponents of
deregulation seem poised to roll back many federal stan-
dards, but thanks to our dynamic model of environmental
federalism, that is not enough to accomplish their goal.
State and local leaders are already hard at work resusci-
tating environmental governance initiatives abandoned by
the federal government. For example, the United States
Climate Alliance is a coalition of 17 states and territories
committed to upholding the objectives of the 2015 Paris
Agreement within their borders, formed the very day Presi-
dent Trump withdrew the United States from the accord.201 
(Indeed, I have never been more grateful for American fed-
eralism than I am right now.) 
For deregulation interests to fully succeed, then, they
must prevent state and local governments from simply
taking up the vacated federal seat at the regulatory table.
For that reason, “Team Deregulation” is unlikely to sim-
ply withdraw the federal government from the regulatory
feld entirely, which would swing open the door to state law
making. Instead, they are likely to seek weaker regulations
partnered with language expressly preempting contrary
state or local rules. If they cannot muster the political capi-
tal to get express preemption into the text, then they will
attempt to persuade a reviewing court to imply it. 
To wit, the Trump Administration is already trying to
get rid of the CAA’s California waiver.202 Since the Admin-
istration is trying to roll back the Obama-era rule increas-
ing emission standards to 54 miles per gallon (mpg) by
196. Clean Air Act, tit. II, Emissions Standards for Moving Sources, Pub. L. No. 
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codifed as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
197. 42 U.S.C. §7543. 
198. Id. §7507. 
199. U.S. EPA, Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, https:// 
www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-
waivers-and-authorizations (last updated June 23, 2017). 
200. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1097 (2009). 
201. U.S. Climate Alliance, Home Page, https://www.usclimatealliance.org (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
202. Robinson Meyer, Te Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and California,
Atlantic, Mar. 6, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2017/03/trump-california-clean-air-act-waiver-climate-change/518649/. 
2025,203 this is the next logical step—otherwise, the states
could simply ignore EPA’s looser rules and follow Cali-
fornia’s more stringent alternative. Tat is why the same
rollback of the 54-mpg standard also eliminates Califor-
nia’s ability to keep it.204 It is critical that environmentalists
preserve the ability of states to continue moving forward
on emissions controls, even as the federal government
attempts to take us backward. 
With all this in mind, environmental advocates must
identify and fortify those realms of federal environmen-
tal law most vulnerable to ceiling preemption after federal
regulations are weakened. We must ensure that neither
Congress nor EPA pairs federal deregulatory eforts with
statutory or regulatory language feld-preempting subna-
tional interference. And we will need to think carefully
about other ways to safeguard the environment—which
brings us to the next P. 
B.  Property Rights 
Even as we respond to the current assault on federal envi-
ronmental law, we also need to think ahead. Deregulation
interests know that even if they succeed in dismantling
those laws today, that will not be enough, since a shift in
national leadership could always bring them back in the
future. So, here is a riddle: what is the best way to prevent
that from happening? 
Public law norms generally prevent governmental deci-
sionmakers from binding their future counterparts, so
legal rules enacted today can ordinarily be revisited in the
future. But that is not always the end of the issue, thanks
to another of Team Deregulation’s favorite strategies. Te
answer to the riddle: fortify the nonregulatory status quo
with property rights. 
Private property rights are a democratic foundation—a
bulwark of protection for individuals against power—but
they can be manipulated in contexts where public and pri-
vate rights overlap, as they so often do in environmental
law. Here in the United States, few legal concerns com-
mand more focused constitutional attention than threats
to private property. Tey receive the full force and atten-
tion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Takings
Clauses, which require compensation when the govern-
ment “takes” property for public use.205 Te defnition of
“take” continues to evolve, however, and these clauses are
sometimes interpreted to require compensation for any
public regulation that interferes with private economic use
of property, even when that use is harming the public.206 
Moreover, private claims often fail to account for counter-
203. Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama Emis-




205. Legal Information Institute, Takings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tak-
ings (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
206. Bill Funk, CPR Perspective: Te Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Cen-
ter for Progressive Reform, http://www.progressivereform.org/persp-
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vailing public property rights in related public commons
natural resources. 
Te “takings-ifcation” of American property law has
been gathering force over time, and today, nothing can take
down an environmental regulation more efciently than
the claim that it constitutes a taking. Which is why, from
the perspective of Team Deregulation, it is such a winning
strategy. Rather than just dismantling environmental reg-
ulations that prevent extraction from public lands, much
better to issue as many oil and gas leases on these newly
opened public lands as possible.207 Tose leases do not just
yield an extractive win for industry in the present, they
will complicate eforts to dial extraction back in the future,
because private extractive rights will then have a thick layer
of constitutional protection. Prof. Christopher Serkin has
persuasively shown how government actors have learned to
consolidate their power in the present, protecting it from
changed policy preferences in the future, by making pre-
commitments into the future through the private law tools
of property and contract.208 
Environmentalists must push back against the stra-
tegic use of property rights to fortify the deregulatory
agenda. Tey must scrutinize eforts to create or reify
private entitlements that would entrench environmental
deregulation by preventing more stringent scrutiny in
the future. Tey must also better educate lawmakers and
judges about the complex relationships within property
and environmental law, to refute the misguided takings-
ifcation that occurs when we fail to account for the over-
lapping public and private interests in natural resources.
As federal law often borrows from state-law concepts of
property, we can never ignore the importance of continu-
ing to develop the common law of property through liti-
gation in state courts. Which brings us, incidentally, to
the third and fnal P challenge. 
C.  Political Scale 
With federal environmental law under sustained attack, it
becomes incumbent on us to think more seriously about
how to continue pursuing solutions to national-level envi-
ronmental problems by means other than federal authority.
More than ever, we are facing interjurisdictional challenges
that cannot be managed efectively in a piecemeal man-
ner.209 Some 50 years ago, we conceded that problems like
air and water pollution, species loss, and climate change
went beyond any single state’s boundaries, or capacity.210 
After the failure of the patchwork-of-states approach,
207. Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Tears Down Regulations to Speed Drilling 
on Public Land, Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2018/02/01/trump-administration-tears-
down-regulations-to-speed-drilling-on-public-land. 
208. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Trough Private Law: Binding Lo-
cal Governments, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879, 894-95 (2011). 
209. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balances in the Interjurisdictional Grey Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503, 567-84 
(2007). See also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within
145-59 (2012). 
210. Id. 
iconic federal laws like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
recognized the importance of centralized national author-
ity to cope with these problems.211 
But what if national authority ends? Disheartening as
it may be, we need to think about new strategies for large-
scale environmental governance that do not rely on federal
law. We should keep fghting to get federal law back—but
in the meantime, the environment cannot wait. 
Te clearest alternative is regional governance. Te
patchwork approach was inefective and challenging for
industry, but what if many states used the same law? Per-
haps we should consider the development of uniform state
laws or model codes that would enable states to coordi-
nate on a broader regulatory scale. Successful examples
like the Uniform Commercial Code,212 the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct,213 and other widely adopted laws
provide a deliberated, tested model for states seeking
sound, consensus-based policies in complex realms of law.
States could adopt them in the wake of withdrawn federal
law or for wholly new areas, addressing climate change,
water pollution, and waste management. For example,
universities nationwide are collaborating on the multidis-
ciplinary development of the Sustainable Development
Code to provide best sustainability practices for adoption
by local governments.214 
Uniform laws provide an obvious model for coordinated
but nonfederal national response, but we might even con-
sider less conventional means. Legal pluralism heralds the
possibility of multiple sources of simultaneous normative
policymaking, including sources beyond sovereign-based
law.215 Could private or nongovernmental rules contribute
to large-scale environmental action? Perhaps there could
be meaningful guidance or rulemaking by commercial
associations like the American Arbitration Association,
professional associations like the American Law Institute,
nongovernmental legal institutions like the Council of
Mayors, religious organizations, trade organizations, uni-
versities, and others? 
In fact, here is a concrete example that puts some of these
ideas together. We all know that climate is the largest-scale
environmental problem of all, ideally calling not only for
national but international policymaking. Yet a substan-
tial volume of climate-relevant decisionmaking occurs
within individual homes and neighborhoods.216 And in the
United States, a large volume amount of that decisionmak-
ing takes place through private homeowner associations
(HOAs). One in fve Americans live in property subject to
211. John P. Dwyer, Te Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. 
Rev. 1183, 1191 (1995). 
212. See generally U.C.C. (1977). 
213. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct (1983). 
214. News Release, Drake University, Drake Law School Forms Partnership 
to Update Sustainable Community Development Code (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://news.drake.edu/2017/02/01/drake-law-school-forms-partnership-
to-update-sustainable-community-development-code/. 
215. Paul Schif Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155 (2007). 
216. Courtney St. John, Changing Household Behavior to Reduce Carbon Emis-
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HOA governance,217 but many are operating without suf-
fcient legal expertise or guidance. Recognizing that prob-
lem, many states enact statutes,218 municipalities provide
guidance,219 and private organizations sponsor training
materials220 for HOA board members, to help them make
better decisions that strengthen their communities. 
So, what if we could impact climate policy by harnessing
the private law infuence of HOA decisionmaking on cli-
mate-relevant matters? Borrowing, perhaps, from parts of
the Sustainable Development Code already in progress,221 
legal architects could draft a model code of HOA best
practices on water conservation, renewable energy use,
217. Ernie Smith, Study: Homeowners Associations Hit New Population Peaks, 
Ass’ns Now, May 15, 2015, https://associationsnow.com/2015/05/study-
homeowners-associations-hit-new-population-peaks/. 
218. Fla. Stat. §720 (2018). 
219. Henrico County, Virginia, Homeowners’ Associations, https://henrico.us/
revit/hoas/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
220. Homeowner Associations USA, A Guide for Homeowner Associa-
tion Board Members (2010). 
221. Drake University, Draft Climate Chapter, Sustainable Com-
munity Development Code, https://drive.google.com/fle/d/
1TolghETH_nuaOCZmz9ck9PFYCJOS-lrb/view. 
transportation considerations, and other issues that impact
the nation’s climate footprint. A model code could also dis-
courage HOAs from preventing solar panels, clotheslines,
rain barrels, or other sustainable practices, and they could
encourage landscaping practices that limit pesticide and
nutrient loading of waterways. 
In the end, overcoming the Tree Ps will require novel
ideas—but we will need some ambitious thinking to move
forward in the difcult days to come. After all, necessity is
the mother of creativity—and has there ever been greater
need than right now? 
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